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Abstract
Domain names were developed to ease the challenges that human beings face
in remembering large sets of numbers such as IP addresses. It is therefore
common practice to name servers based on the services they provide or the ad-
ministrative group they belong to. There is however a disadvantage with this
practice, as it gives the same level of information to cyber adversaries about the
role of servers within an organization’s network. This information might be a
security threat by itself. This paper investigates the impact that attractive fully
qualified domain names (FQDN) might have in making such servers more tar-
geted than servers with non-attractive FQDN, and addresses the null hypothe-
sis of the author, that the majority of the attacks, do not take into consideration
the FQDN. Statistical analysis of the collected data from the virtual honeynet
set up for this investigation, shows that the null hypothesis is true, and having
attractive FQDN does not have a significant impact on the preferences of cyber
adversaries to probe systems within a given organization’s network. Further-
more, in this thesis, an attempt is being made to identify previously reported
offensive source IP addresses and updated trends of the source country for the
majority of the malicious instigators are presented.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 1
Introduction
The advancement in Information and Communication Technology has come a
long way to contribute in a dramatic change that a mankind has seen so far.
This advancement made most of daily operations to be carried out via appli-
cations and services over computer networks from one end of the world to
another in a short period of time. Computer networks or commonly known as
networks refers to all computers and other hardware devices interconnected
via communication channels for the purpose of sharing resources and infor-
mation [1].
Today, our daily life is becoming more dependent on Information and Com-
munication Technology than ever before. With the wide availability and acces-
sibility of Internet in almost every corner of the world, businesses are steadily
moving from traditional shops to e-commerce, institutions of higher education
continue to make their services, training and teaching, available to a wide va-
riety of audience via distance learning rather than only on-campus lecturing,
governmental service are moving to e-government, timely information are be-
ing shared and accessed almost everywhere due to the incredible progress in
the area of Information and Communication technology (ICT). The benefits
ICT brought to human life in the digital age could be volumes of text. What
is pointed out here is only the beginning. However, ICT has also brought a
number of social challenges such as privacy concern, fraud, identity theft, cy-
ber espionage, hacking via computer virus, worms, Trojans to mention a few
[2, 3].
Internet is a multifaceted unit which is comprised of various networks, users,
and resources. Though this technology was designed to improve the well-
being of an individual’s and an organization’s daily operation by allowing
only legitimate users to access systems and application when requested. How-
ever, network systems which are the backbone of the Internet are suffering
from cyber adversaries who are permanently trying to exploit potential vul-
nerabilities within these systems. A compromised host on a network will sur-
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render its resources and can be used as a tool to launch an attack to other
legitimate hosts in the network. Hackers try their best to use all their tools
and skills as possible to get detailed information about a network then launch
attack against the network.
In order to counter these malicious users and their tools, getting enough infor-
mation about them gives a security professional an upper hand in safeguard-
ing the network systems. The lesson that could be learned from analysing at-
tacks includes the types of attack such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS),
password based attack etc, most probed services SSH, SMTP, HTTP, MySQL
etc and nature of the attacks-is it a targeted or random, identifying malicious
IP address, domains and their geographical location. This will enable system
administrators and network security professionals to take necessary precau-
tions before the attack materialize and also it will help to design a recovery
plan in case the attackers succeed in compromising the network systems. The
main intention behind designing honeypot was to learn about hackers [4]. The
Cuckoo’s Egg by Clifford Stoll and the whitepaper An Evening with Berferd in
Which a Cracker Is Lured, Endured, and Studied by Bill Cheswick are the two
early publications which can be referred as the core stone for the designing of
honeypot [4].
Computer and network systems have made an incredible advancement in
the last two decades. They became very sophisticated enough to perform
high level algorithmic execution and disseminate data within a blink but at
the same time challenges against their true intention have also sky-rocketed.
Therefore, if these systems are not properly secured and are breached, the con-
sequence could be very severe to an organization or an individual.
Cyber-attack has being on the rise for the last decades as the power and capa-
bility of computer systems advances. It has become often a news headline. On
the last week of August 2013 two major incidents of cyber-attack reported by
different news agency about the downtime of New York Times web site and
the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC). ” The New York
Times blamed a prolonged website outage on Tuesday 27 August 2013 due to
an attack on the domain name registrar of Melbourne IT. A story published
by The Times on Tuesday 27 August afternoon quoted the company’s CIO,
Marc Frons, as saying the disruption was the result of an external attack on
the registrar by the Syrian Electronic Army, or someone trying ”very hard” to
impersonate the hacking group. The paper’s main site was intermittently un-
available for several hours that afternoon and remained unavailable until after
7.00 p.m. ET.” [5].
The second successful attack which took place within the same week of the
month against China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) was re-
ported by Voice of America news agency. After a distribute denial of service
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(DDOS) attack on The china Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC)
on August 25, Matthew Prince, the chief executive of CloudFlare, a company
that provides Web performance and security services for more than a million
websites, said ” China saw a 32 percent drop in Internet traffic for domains in
the company’s network during the two-hour attack” [6].
On the third of October 2013 Adobe Systems Inc., a software developer, con-
firmed that their systems had been compromised by a sophisticated cyber-
attack. The hackers were able to retrieve information of 2.9 million Adobe
customers, including customer names, encrypted credit or debit card num-
bers, expiration dates, and other information relating to customer orders [7].
Another attack against Australian websites was successfully carried out by
anonymous that is allegedly originated from Indonesia. The attack affected
over 100 sites. Small sized businesses were the victims of the attack and their
website messages were replaced by ”Stop spying on Indonesia”, and an image
of a Guy Fawkes silhouette on the Indonesian and Australian flags. This at-
tack was as a response to the allegation that Australian embassy in Indonesia
was participating in the United States of America (US) lead spy network. The
claim was made based on the leaked information by former US National Secu-
rity Agency employee, Edward Snowden [8].
The attacks towards computer networks are aimed in countering the pillars
of Information security, which are Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
(CIA). Confidentiality refers to making sure that information is accessed by
authorized parties only. Integrity refers to the authenticity and completeness
of information. Availability refers to making sure the needed information is
accessible by authorized parties when needed [9].
The internetworked world made achieving the goals of these three pillars of
IT more challenging as data and information are being processed, stored and
transferred via computer networks. Therefore, computer and network security
has become a crucial part in the field of ICT and is considered as a battle field
for the blackhat community (hackers) and system or network administrators[10,
11].
ICT has become a backbone of organizations and the smooth organizational
operations is heavily dependent on network security. Network security is a
process of securing network systems from been harmed by malicious activi-
ties. Network security is not available as a single product but it is a system that
combines multiple layers of security[12]. The effectiveness of network security
is measured by its ability in identifying threats, analyzing threats, and then
selecting adequate security controls to combat or neutralize them[12]. Differ-
ent techniques and tools have been developed to detect, prevent and respond
against malicious activities.
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One of the tools used in the area of network security is Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem (IDS). There are three types of IDS known as host-based, network based
and hybrid IDS. Host-based intrusion detection system (IDS) is software de-
ployed on the system itself and can scan all resources within it [13]. The ac-
tivities are logged to a secure database and are compared against any known
malicious events listed in the knowledge base[13]. OSSEC is an open source
example of HIDS which is able to analyze logs, alert, detect, response and
check file integrity [14]. The second type of IDS is network based intrusion de-
tection system (NIDS) which is deployed on the network to examine network
packets against attacks. NIDS receives all packets on a particular network seg-
ment, including switched networks via one of several methods, such as taps
or port mirroring. Hybrid IDS combines HIDS and NIDS[13].
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) also known as intrusion detection preven-
tion systems (IDPS) is a system that monitors a network for malicious activities
such as security threats or policy violations. IPS’s key features include iden-
tifying suspicious activity, log information, attempt to block the activity, and
report. It can be implemented as a hardware or software. IPS are basically
extensions of intrusion detection systems with one major difference in their
ability to actively blocking or preventing intrusions that are detected. For ex-
ample, an IPS can drop malicious packets by blocking traffic from an offending
IP address etc[15].
With the rapid change the way attacks are carried out in the digital world,
timely information and knowledge about attackers and their motives and tools
gives a privilege to network security professionals. IDS and IPS have some
shortcomings, such as detecting new attacks due to the lack of signatures in
their database, collecting more information about attacker’s activities, meth-
ods and skills, generating high number of false positives. These tools are also
mostly deployed to protect organization assets from cyber threats rather than
learning about network adversaries and their tools [16]. Therefore, honeypot
a tool that aimed in learning about these adversaries and their techniques was
developed.
Honeypot is a decoy computer system that is dedicated to be attacked, probed
and compromised in order to learn about cyber adversaries techniques, mo-
tives and tools [17]. The value of a honeypot depends on effectiveness and
attractiveness of its setup [17]. Honeypot can be categorized based on interac-
tion to the attackers, deployment type, its architecture or purpose of deploy-
ment [18].
Honeynet is a network of honeypots which are specifically designed for the
purpose of being probed, attacked and compromised by the blackhat commu-
nity [18]. It is a category of high level interaction honeypot that are mostly
used in the field of research to study tactics, motives and tools of cyber adver-
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saries. It can also be used to identify zero day attacks [19]. Honeynet collects
more information about attacker’s behaviour and tactics as it is a set of dif-
ferent computer systems with services that are installed and configured in the
same way as those of production system, but data stored on these systems are
not real. However, from the intruders point of view these data and the system
should seem real in order for the intruders to think that they compromised a
production systems [17].
The core technology of honeynet includes three aspects: Data control mecha-
nism, Data capture mechanism and Data analysis mechanism. They are secu-
rity measures designed with avoiding any compromised honeypot being used
as a tool of attack by the hacker [20]. Honeypots have been actively used as
a research tool within the network security research works for since late 90th
[21].
1.1 Motivations
The internetworked systems are constantly suffering from malicious activities
as they have been probed to find out how they can be exploited due to their
vulnerabilities by cyber criminals for different reasons. Cyber crime are be-
coming more and more a concern to individuals and business in daily opera-
tion. Hardly a day goes by without an incident where a system connected to
the Internet been scanned or probed by attackers. The advancement in the area
of computer technology has been incredible, but at the same time the ill action
towards these systems has also increased in magnitude and tactics. Today, net-
work scanning tools are capable of retrieving more detailed information about
network systems including IP address, OS, domain names etc [22].
TCP/IP has become the de facto network communication protocol[23]. It is a
four layers suite with each layer is developed to perform a specific task indi-
vidually and work well in coordination with the rest of the layers in order for
the communication between Internet hosts to be successfully achievable [13].
Communication between two Internet hosts takes place due to the unique IP
address of each Internet host is assigned to and the port numbers that are al-
located to service. The combination of IP address and port number makes a
network socket.
Computers only understand bits which are 0s and 1s. Therefore, they are as-
signed IP address that can identify each Internet host and made communica-
tion possible across networks. But the limitation of human mind to remember
many numbers could hinder the advantages that can be harvested from this
technology if a solution has not been provided. This would have been one of
the main difficulties if resolving IP addresses to domain names that humans
can remember more easily than a series of numbers and vise-versa. Based on
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CIA World Factbook in 2012 there were around 903,909,315 Internet host in the
world [24]. According to Internet Systems Consortium, Inc quarterly survey
about each Internet host based on address space and domain names as of July
2013, there are 996,230,575 [25]. Taking this two source as credible within less
than a year there were 92,321,260 new Internet hosts. This shows how difficult
it is to remember the IP address one need to use.
It is a common practice to call things based on the service that they provide
or give them descriptive names. This practice of giving domain names to in-
ternet hosts by the services they offer or by the administrative group that they
belong to is also commonly used or practical. For example mail.example.com
refers to the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of a mail server within the
domain example.com or accounting.example.com refer the fully qualified do-
main name (FQDN) of a server that hosts the accounting applications and re-
lated information of an organization. This helps legitimate users to remember
it easily and which Internet host to access based on their particular need as the
name is very descriptive.
However, the same level of information- about the domain name that was in-
tended to minimize the tendency to memorizing, is also available to cyber ad-
versaries. Every small information can give extra advantage to an attacker
about network system as he or she might look for vulnerable system and sys-
tems that have more valuable and confidential information on the Internet.
Honeynet is a favourable tool to carry out such research project as there is no
real production value on the systems deployed but they appear real produc-
tion systems from the intruder’s point of view.
1.2 Problem Statement
This paper will try to verify the claim saying attractive fully qualified domain
names such as hr.example.com or accounting.exmple.com can attract cyber ad-
versaries attention than non-attractive fully qualified domain names. This will
be investigated by deploying virtual honeypots and make them intentionally
vulnerable. The following research questions will be ad-dressed on this pa-
per.
1. Are attractive fully qualified domain names more targeted than non-
attractive fully qualified domain names(FQDN)?
2. Does a different platform have a role in the popularity of a host?
3. Which services are more probed? Does the probe has the same magni-
tude on both groups?
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4. How many of the source IP addresses are previously identified for their
malicious nature? Identify source IP address geographical location?
1.3 Thesis Structure
This paper is organized in seven chapters where the background and litera-
ture review that are relevant to this research are categorized under chapter 2.
Chapter 3 of this paper is dedicated for the approach and methodology that
the research will follow to reach its goal. This includes the hardware and soft-
ware experimental set-up and how data is collected and analysed to answer
the problem statement of this research. The result of the experiment will be
presented on chapter 4 and the next section of the document will analyse the
result found in this project under category chapter 5. Chapter 6 will consist
the discussion section that elaborates on the general overview of the project
and its findings as a whole and future work. Chapter 7 will be the conclusion
section of the document. References and Appendix will be provided at the end
of the paper.
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Chapter 2
Background and literature
The use of computer technology in our individual or organizational day to
day activities have become inevitable as we are becoming more and more de-
pendent on the services provided in the digital world. This technology makes
more sense and contribute a greater deal to our well-being because it enables
us to connect with each other over networks. Many easy looking things can
be an amazing example of the magic behind computer networks. For exam-
ple cash withdrawing from ATM where an individual is identified via per-
sonal identification number against his or her stored information on a bank’s
database and the service is provided or denied based on user’s legitimacy as
well as account balance. Another sparkling example that computer network-
ing brought to our daily life is that the ease and effectiveness of collaboration
via different means such as video conference, IRC etc.
The success and sustainability of an organization is highly affected in the time-
liness and accuracy of information. Information refers to a processed data.
In today’s world data is collected, processed, stored and transmitted through
computer networks. Therefore, securing computer networks in the digital age
becomes very crucial for the existence of an organization can depend on the
safety and security of the data transmitted to and accessed by via computer
networks.
2.1 Principles of Information Security
When we think of securing a computer network, basically our main objective
is securing data and information. Therefore, it is necessary to briefly discuss
Information security and its pillars. In a simple and universal definition, in-
formation security refers to making sure that information confidentiality has
been maintained, its integrity is not compromised and it is available to legit-
imate user when needed. These pillars is abbreviated by CIA in the field of
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computer science. Elaborating these pillars might give a better understanding
and how they are related to this project [13, 26].
2.1.1 Confidentiality
Information is power has been a long standing proverb in human history. Any
information that has been accessed by unauthorized entity lacks confidential-
ity. Hence it has been a long norm that information has been categorized in dif-
ferent levels and only those who have permission are allowed to access them.
In today’s world this norm has been adopted and is practiced with a greater
attention as most information are collected, processed, stored and transmitted
via computer networks[26].
Information accessed by unauthorized entities might have an overwhelming
consequence to individuals, organizations and nations. According to the study
conduct by Symantec Corporation and Ponemon Institute in 2013, the cost of
data breach for companies in US is estimated to be about $5.4 million and
Germany $4.8 million. France and Australia are listed on top for loosing high
number of customers due to breach of data by unauthorized entities [27] On
the internetworked world information confidentiality can be threatened due
to malware, intruders, improperly configured systems, social engineering, and
lack of proper network security.
2.1.2 Integrity
In the field of information security the term integrity refers to trustworthiness,
origin, completeness, and correctness of information as well as the preven-
tion of improper or unauthorized modification of information [9]. Information
integrity can be compromised intentionally or unintentionally whichever the
case, the consequences of a compromised information can be very damaging.
For example as patients medical record are stored on a computer systems any
unauthorized alteration to this vital data might put the patient’s life in danger.
The threats that can materialize against information integrity on computer net-
works could be data deletion, injection or replacing [26].
2.1.3 Availability
The third pillar of information security is availability. Data or information
might be collected, processed and stored as well its integrity might have been
maintained but if it is not available to the legitimate users when it is needed,
its values might decrease or create user dissatisfaction. However, availability
doesn’t only focus on the information itself but also on the applications and
systems [26].
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Any downtime of a system leads to unavailability of the information which
could lead to a delay in critical decision making that might have a very signif-
icant impact depending on the urgency of the matter. Denial of service attack
is the biggest threat to this pillar of information security in cybercrime. The
outage of The New York times for 7 hours on the 28th of august 2013 is a good
example of this. A security researcher at Tripwire Ken Westin has told BBC
that if a denial-of-service attack is successful millions of users are at risk [28].
Though only CIA are highlighted above but terms identification, authentica-
tion and authorization are part and parcel of information security. The image
below depicts the components of information security.
Figure 2.1: Information security components[29].
2.2 TCP/IP Stack
TCP/IP is extensively deployed and has become a de facto protocol in the in-
ternetworking computing facilities. It is a four layer based network model
where each layer carries out a specific task in the communication process [23].
Each layer is developed independently without impacting the others but it co-
operates to provide full functionality. The four layers of TCP/IP are briefly
summarized below [13].
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Layer 4. Application Layer
The top most layer of TCP/IP is the application layer which defines appli-
cation protocols and how host programs interface with the next layer. All
higher-level protocols such as Domain Name System (DNS), Hypertext Trans-
fer Protocol (HTTP), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Simple Mail Transfer Proto-
col (SMTP), Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), X Windows etc. operates at this
layer [13, 30].
Layer 3. Transport Layer
The next layer to the application layer in TCP/IP network mode is the trans-
port layer. This layer delineate the level of service and status of the connection
during data transfer. Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) main protocols belong to this layer [13, 30].
Layer 2. Internet Layer
This layer is responsible for packing data into IP datagrams that contains in-
formation of the source and the destination addresses (logical address or IP
address) which is used to forward diagrams to hosts in networks. Internet
Protocol (IP), Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP), Reverse Address Resolution Protocol (RARP) and Internet
Group Management Protocol (IGMP) are protocols that belong to this layer
[13, 30].
Layer 1. Network Access Layer/Interface Layer
Network Access Layer refers to physical network and physical related appara-
tus that are in charge for data transmission. Routing and data synchronization,
data format checking, signal conversion, error detection processes are handled
by this layer. Some of the protocols that belongs to this layer includes Ethernet,
FDDI, Frame Relay, Token Ring etc [13, 30].
2.3 Domain Names
As mentioned in the above section TCP/IP has become a dominant network
protocol on the Internet. Data transmission between endpoints on the Internet
is carried out by Internet Protocol (IP) which uses IP addresses that are allo-
cated to both endpoints in computer networks. IP addresses are binary num-
bers meaning that 0s and 1s which can be understood by computers. IPv4 and
IPv6 are the two versions that are being used by Internet Protocol (IP) today.
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These two versions consists 32 and 128 bits fixed length of addresses respec-
tively. These bits are not easily memorable by humans therefore the need to
translate them to human readable numeric values is inescapable. For example
01001010.01111101.00101011.01101100 is an IPv4 address in a form of binaries
to 74.125.43.108. Though the conversion of the computer understandable bi-
nary values to human readable numeric values helped humans to remember
some limited IP addresses relatively easily, it does not eliminate the human
memory challenges as the number of hosts increase within an organization or
the general rapid increase of Internet hosts. The other problem with numeric
IP addresses are that they are not descriptive. For example 74.125.43.108 does
not give any information at all. Therefore, domain name becomes a necessity
to solve the problem.
Based on CIA World Factbook for 2012 there were around 903,909,315 Internet
host in the world [24]. Internet host refers to any computer system directly
connected to the Internet. Internet Systems Consortium, Inc which conducts
complete quarterly survey about each Internet host based on address space
and domain names has also it quarterly survey data for Jul 2013 and the total
count based on their survey was 996,230,575 [25].
The need for domain names was due to the growth in the Internet [31]. The fol-
lowing graph was retrieved from Internet Systems Consortium, Inc web page
that shows the rapid increase in Internet hosts within the last two decades
starting from Jan 1994 to Jan 2013 [25].
Domain name represents a given IP address in the Internet. Humans remem-
ber domain names easily than the numeric IP addresses and hosts on net-
work can be identified to each other based on a trusted host name authenti-
cation mechanism. For example the www.hioa.no is a name that is assigned to
the web server at Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences
(HiOA) which has an IPv4 of 158.36.78.65. The domain name provided while
trying to connect a destination point in the Internet needs to be converted to
numeric IP addresses that a computer could understand. This is called do-
main name resolution. The mapping or resolving of the domain names to IP
address and vice-versa is performed by Domain Name System (DNS). DNS is
a hierarchical data base that consists of name space which is made up of do-
main names tree. Every node within this tree might or might not have resource
records related to the domain name.
It is a usual naming practice to call Internet host based on the service they are
offering or the administrative group they belong to. For example mail.example.com
refers to the fully qualified domain name of the mail server of the domain ex-
ample.com and accounting.example.com to refer to the fully qualified domain
name of the server that hosts the accounting applications and related informa-
tion of an organization. This helps users to easily remember domain names
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Figure 2.2: Internet Domain Survey Host Count[25].
and access a particular internet host by name as the name is very descriptive.
However, since the same level of information is also available to cyber adver-
saries it can give an attacker an idea on a potential systems to target as he or
she might look for vulnerable system or systems that have more valuable and
confidential information on the Internet.
2.4 Network Scan and Attack
2.4.1 Network Scan
Computer networks are continuously probed. Network probing refers to try-
ing to gain unauthorized access to a network system. Port scanning is one type
of network probing. It can be performed by system or network administrators
to verify system or network status and it can also be used by attackers to check
host’s availability and the range of services running on host that are active and
exploitable due to known vulnerability on them [32].
Port scan can be carried out via several ways to probe network to get more
information about network systems by cyber adversaries. TCP connect()scan,
TCP SYN or half-open scan, TCP FIN,XMAS, and NULL scans, TCP idle scan,
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UDP scan, ICMP echo scanning are some of the common scanning mechanism
that are integrated with scanning technologies like Nmap [33]. Tcp scan is con-
sidered as the main port scanning mechanism and the most stable of all port
scans as it tries to manipulate the three-way handshake connection establish-
ment process of TCP protocol [34].
A legitimate TCP connection is a three-way handshake meaning that the client
sends SYN (synchronize) packet to the server, on receiving the packet the
server replies with SYNchronize-ACKnowledgement (SYN+ACK) packet and
the client sends an ACKnowledgement (ACK) packet to confirm and so that
they establish TCP socket connection for data to be transferred between them.
After the communication between the two end computers is over, the TCP
socket connection will be torn down with another three-way communication
[35]. The following figure depicts the three-way communication establish-
ment.
Figure 2.3: TCP Three-Way Handshake Connection Establishment Procedure.
TCP protocol acknowledges data been successfully received and reassembled
in order. Thus unlike UDP, TCP qualifies as reliable protocol [35]. For example
in the case of TCP SYN or half-open scan, the scanner host send SYN packet
when receive SYN + ACK packet, it does not reply with ACK but the connec-
tions remains half open until the TCP connection is timed out, normally in 75
seconds. This might force the server to drop any connection if the backlog
queue of the server reaches its limit [36].
2.4.2 Network Attack
An attack in computer and network security refers to an attempt to bypass
a system’s security due exploitable vulnerabilities that exist in operating sys-
tems (OS), service or applications [34]. Attacks generally can be classified as
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Figure 2.4: TCP SYN or half-open scan Procedure.
passive or active. Active attacks are those attacks launched to destroy or al-
ter data while passive attacks are aimed at intercepting or reading data on the
network without making any modification on them but try to extract valuable
information like passwords, credit details etc [37].
Network attacks can also be targeted or opportunistic. Targeted network at-
tacks are specifically aiming to compromise a particular network systems. These
type of attacks are usually coordinated and well planned as they are unique
by their nature [38]. The recent attack that targeted Australian Internet hosts
between October and November of this year which was claimed by the Anony-
mous group originated in Indonesia is a good recent example of such an attack
[8]. Opportunistic network attacks are attacks that are commonly referred as
random attacks which look for network systems which can be compromised
due to the vulnerability that exists with them. The vulnerability could be on
OS, services, misconfiguration etc [39].
Attack against a network systems can be internal-attack which are launched
from within the premise of a specific network or external-attack that is launched
from outside [37]. Some of the widely used and known network attacks in-
cludes brute-force attack, dictionary attack, Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS),
code injection, password attacks, Tcp SYN flooding attack, password sniffing
etc [37, 23]. Attacks can exploit vulnerability at each layer of the TCP/IP suite.
Previous researches have showed that more than 90% of Internet attacks use
TCP [36, 40]. The next section will briefly highlight some of the commonly
used and known cyber-attack methods against network systems.
• TCP SYN Flooding Attack is one of the widely used denial-of-attack tac-
tics to compromise network systems. Though it has been known since
mid-90s, but no full remedy has yet been successful against it[37, 23]. It
manipulates the three-way handshake of TCP connection mechanisms,
but does not send the ACK packet after receiving the SYN+ACK packet
from the listener for its first packet which is SYN. The three-way hand-
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shake in TCP connection establishment has been explained on the section
Network Scan and is also illustrated by figure on the same section. The
attacker floods the target machine with SYN packets directing at the list-
ing TCP port in order to cause denial-of-service for legitimate users [36].
The aim of this attack is not overloading network resources or memory
of the host, but exhausting the backlog of the server which is associated
with the port number due to full of bogus half-open connection which
results the rejection of legitimate SYN segments. This attack is often car-
ried out by spoofed IP addresses which will not verify the SYN+ACK
from the listener for the initial SYN packet it has received. This type of
attack is applicable to TCP based service such FTP, SMTP etc [41].
• Dictionary attack is another form of break-in to a network system based
on systematically entering dictionary words as a username and pass-
word. The success of this attack relies on the legitimate users way of
setting their password on systems. It is a common practice that user
choose ordinary words. This can be easily prevented by set strong alpha-
numeric passwords and apply strong password enforcement mechanism.
A form of dictionary attack is often used by spammers by sending mes-
sages that contain names and word to email address [23].
• Brute-force attack is another common attack method that tries to break
into a network system by trial and error mechanism. Nowadays such at-
tacks are performed by automating a consecutive guesses to find a pair
of user name and password combination in order to get access to net-
work systems. Such attacks can be prevented by limiting the number of
failed attempts permitted at a given time and choosing strong password
which consists of alpha-numeric with upper and lower case and special
characters [37].
• Code Injection is an attack that is performed by injecting malicious codes
to program or web applications. The injected malicious code will be ex-
ecuted with the application to fulfill its purpose. The attack takes ad-
vantage of inaccurate input/output validation vulnerabilities that exist
in web or program application. Successful code injection attack could re-
sult in malfunctioning operation or asset destruction. Some of the widely
used code injection attacks includes Sql Injection, HTML Injection, Cross
Site Scripting, HTTP Response Splitting, HTTP Request Splitting and
XML Poisoning Attack [20, 41].
2.5 Network Security
Network security refers to safeguarding computer network components and
resources accessed via network from unauthorized users. It is a fundamental
constituent of every network design. A good network security should safe-
guard all network layers [11]. The effectiveness of network security depends
on the knowledge and understanding of the threats around the network, the
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weakness within the network that can be exploited and how can they be ex-
ploited. The online threats that can cause damage to a computer network have
been outlined on the introduction part of this paper and under the section
Principles of Information Security, they are categorized against which of the
information security pillars that they can materialize. Bruce Schneier on his
book titled ”Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World” classifies
security goals into in preventing, detecting, and responding against malicious
activity [12].
There are different tools and technology that are used to secure networks and
learn about attacks against computer networks. These tools can be categorized
based on which goal of network security they intend to achieve, some of them
can be applicable to prevention, detection and responding.
2.5.1 Prevention
Prevention in network security refers to avert any unauthorized activities against
computer networks and the resources using the network. This model of net-
work security deals with:
• Authentication: any access to a network is authenticated via different
mechanisms such as user id and passwords, PIN, digital certificate, Ker-
beros etc. If not authenticated then user will be prevented from accessing
the system [13].
• Authorization: confirms what privileges the authenticated user has. For
example which directories the user can access[13].
• Access Control: is used to assure integrity and confidentiality of data.
This mechanism can be applied via security policy like Discretionary Ac-
cess Control (DAC) or Mandatory Access Control (MAC) [13].
Firewall is one way of preventing network security by allowing only autho-
rized connections to and from a network or computer based on predefined
policy. Firewall can be deployed as a hardware or software or a combination
of both [13, 14, 15, 18].
2.5.2 Detection
Detection from a network security perspective refers to identify any malicious
activity in a network or a system. Detection of intrusion can be performed
on host or network level or hybrid of both [13]. Host-based intrusion de-
tection system (HIDS)is deployed on a host system and tries to detect any
abnormal activities on the system. Captured activities are compared against
signatures, rules and heuristics in knowledge base to identify unauthorized
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activities. Some example of HIDS includes OSSEC, Tripwire, AIDE [14, 13].
Network-based intrusion detection system (NIDS)is deployed on a network to
detect any abnormal activities on network traffic. NIDS accesses the network
traffic through either network tap, span port, or hub. Any abnormal activity
will be flagged. Snort is an example of NIDS. The role of a IDS is passive, only
gathering, identifying, logging, and alerting [13].
2.5.3 Response
Security is all about minimizing the magnitude of risks. Risks cannot be com-
pletely avoided, but they can be reduce to a limit. In the digital world a com-
plete prevention against threats is almost unachievable due to the wide range
of weakness that expands from the systems and network vulnerability to legit-
imate users ignorance or lack of awareness [12]. Detecting an attack on time is
a marvelous achievement but if an appropriate response on due course is not
given, the effectiveness of the security measure in place is not mature [42].
Response does not only mean getting rid of the problem but also been able
to trace and find the attacker. This might not be an easy task on the Internet
as attackers may impersonate their origin, but if successful it might be used
as evidence against the intruder should prosecution take place. The incident
response measure could include deny access to an intruder, report to Incident
Response Team or responsible party, containing an intrusion and limiting the
actions of an intruder , gather as much information as possible , clean affected
system or network and restore system to operational status [12, 42].
2.6 Honeypots and Its Categories
According to the book called ”Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Net-
worked World” authored by Bruce Schneier security was labeled as process,
but not a product[12]. Based on this quote securing a network means learn-
ing about the possible network assaults (attacks) that can take advantage over
the weaknesses (vulnerabilities)of the network. Though there are a number of
different security solution available today to hinder and learn about network
attacks, but none of them can provide a full solution as standalone. Therefore,
complementing of the security systems is inevitable. Honeypot is one of these
tools that has been used in researching and learning about computer and net-
work attacks in the last decades [20, 17].
Honeypot is a decoy information system aimed in deceiving intruders by con-
vincing them that they are interacting with a real production system [17]. The
information within this system is not of any use for an organization, but they
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are purposely designed to look like real in order to attract attackers. Therefore,
any connection to and from the honeypot is considered malicious.
Honeypots has got several advantages over the other network security tools
such as intrusion detection systems. Honeypot is a proactive detection tech-
nique while IDS is defensive. IDS generates high number of false positive
while honeypot does not as there should not be any connection to and from
the system. Honeypot generates more sufficient data for forensics analysis
than that of IDS. It detects zero-day attacks, while IDS has shortage to detect
them due to the lack of signature on the knowledge base it uses to compare
captured activities. Honeypots can be categorized based on their interaction
level, [21, 43]
2.6.1 Honeypot by Interaction Level
Honeypots can be classified based on the level of interaction a honeypot will
have with an intruder depending on what kind of information are needed to be
collected and to what level does a system or service been emulated to pretend
to look like a real system or service. This also determines whether to setup
low, high or medium interaction level honeypot [14, 4, 21].
Low-Interaction Honeypot
This type of honeypots does not provide to the intruder a real services and
operating systems, but emulated once. Low interaction honeypots are easy to
install due to their non complex design and basic functionality. The attackers
have a very limited level of interaction as the services are predesignated. Set-
ting up Kojoney SSH server and allowing an intruder to penetrate the system
via brute force attack while collecting information about the intruder activities
is an example of low level interaction honeypot [44].
Low interaction honeypots are more useful in detecting illicit scans and con-
nection trials. The risk low interaction honeypot poses to other systems is low
as the intruder is provided limited functionality and no real operating sys-
tem. Though this can be seen as an advantage, the information gathered about
the attacker is also limited. For most part the information collected is limited
to the time and date attack as well IP and ports of source and destination of
the attack. Low interactive honeypots are mostly limited for known attacks
or behaviour [4, 44]. Some low level interaction honeypot are highlighted be-
low:
• BackOfficer Friendly (BOF)runs on barely Unix but mainly on windows-
based OS and emulates some basic services such http, ftp or mail. It fakes
replies which keeps the attacker to interact therefore information can be
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gathered. BOF monitors only limited number of ports and its value is in
detection [4, 44, 45].
• HoneyBOT is another windows-based low interaction honeypot and lis-
tens to wide range of sockets within the system by mimicking services
with vulnerability. It fools an intruders by making them to think that
they attempt is successful against a real system. The activity of the at-
tacker will be logged for later analysis [46].
• PHP.HOP is used to trap attackers targeting web application vulnera-
bilities. It emulates various well known web application vulnerabilities
[16].
• Glastopf is designed with the ability to emulate thousands of web appli-
cations vulnerabilities in order to collect information about web applica-
tion attacks. It responds to the attackers as he or she expects from the
vulnerability tried to be exploited [44, 47].
• Kojoney was designed to emulate SSH service. It was developed in
Python programming language and has the capability to present infor-
mative statistical text report [48].
• Honeyd simulates TCP and UDP services and aims in detecting, cap-
turing and alerting illicit activities. It can be implemented in Unix like
and some version of Windows-based OS to listen to network traffic. It
replies to network packets that are destined to one of IP addresses of the
honeypots that it stimulates [49].
Medium Interaction Honeypots
Medium Interaction Honeypots merges the advantages of low and high level
interaction honeypots especially in detecting botnet and collecting malware.
This kind of honeypots does not simulate completely the OS or services, but
they provide higher level of interaction with the intruder comparing to low
level interaction honeypot and deceive the intruders to send their payload
which can be analyzed later. Installing and configuring medium interaction
honeypots are time consuming and relatively not easy compared to low in-
teractions honeypots. However, more information will be collected than low
interaction honeypot [1, 4, 50]. Some of examples of medium interaction hon-
eypots are listed below:-
• Mwcollectd was the first Open Source Medium Interaction Honeypot
developed by Georg Wicherski. Version 3.0 was rewrote in September
2005 with advancement to the older version. Mwcollectd was merged
with the nepenthes project in February 2006 [46, 50]. This is mentioned
for the sake of history.
• Nepenthes is designed to run on variety OS, including Windows via
Cygwin, UNIX like systems and BSD. It emulates vulnerabilities widely
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used by worms to spread malicious substance. It can bind itself with
wide range of ports to receive connections from the internet [46, 50].
• Multipot is another graphical Medium Interaction Honeypot designed
for Windows-based OS. It is not very scalable for distribution and de-
ployment dedication. It is developed based on mwcollect concept [46,
50].
• Kippo is a medium interaction honeypot designed to log brute force at-
tacks as well shell interaction that take place with the intruder [51].
High Interaction Honeypots
High Interaction Honeypots are real systems that are dedicated to be com-
promised by adversaries. They are deployed with real operating system and
applications that are made intentionally vulnerable in order to be exploited.
They have better capability of collecting information about attacks and attack-
ers activity than low and medium interaction honeypots [50, 52].
Deploying high interaction honeypots gives the leverage of learning and de-
tecting about new tools, vulnerabilities in operating systems or applications
and communication mechanisms or method used among members of blackhat
community. It can become accustomed to new command and control protocols
[1, 44].
Though high interaction honeypots provides much information about the at-
tacks and attackers activity is an advantage, but they are very complex to setup
and pose a high risk as the attacker is provided with real OS and applications
and this system can be used as a tool to attack other legitimate systems on the
internet. To avoid harm to other legitimate systems on the internet, this kind
of setup must be highly controlled and preferably deployed behind firewall
[4, 11]. Some examples of such type of honeypots include:-
• Argos is based on open source emulator QEMU. It virtual high-interaction
honeypots designed to identify zero-day attacks like new worms. It effi-
ciently monitors and detects a compromised virtual machines in time by
logging all traffic via tcpdump to a database [16, 53].
• High Interaction Honeypot Analysis Toolkit (HIHAT)is web-based high-
interaction Honeypots with the ability to analyze and visualize data col-
lected via graphical user interface. Some of the key feature of HIHAT
include detecting Sql-Injection, (Source) File-Inlcusions, produces statis-
tics about system traffic and provides geographical location and other
details of the attacker [52].
• Honeynet is one type of high interaction honeypots. It is a network of
several honeypots which can consists different plantforms and OS . De-
ploying honeynet could yield in gathering a large amount of data about
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different types of attacks at the same time and make a qualitative analy-
sis based on the information collected [16, 52]. Honeywall CDROM is the
core element in the setup of honeynet which collects traffic information
and activities performed on the honeypot.
• Symantec Decoy Server is developed by Symantec as a commercial high-
interaction honeypot. It takes over the host system hardware to create
four cage which will act as honeypot. Every cage has its own operating
system and the attacker will interact with them by considering the inter-
action is taking place with a real system without realizing they are under
trap [52, 53].
2.6.2 Honeypot by Purpose
Honeypot can also be categorized based on their purpose rather than only by
their interaction level. This type of honeypot categorization was coined by
Marty Roesch, developer of Snort [4].
Production honeypots
Production honeypots are deployed as part of security mechanisms for organi-
zations network. They are designed as security enforcement and detect illicit
activities but the attacker’s information collected through these types of hon-
eypots are limited comparing to research honeypots. They are fairly easy to
setup and are often used by commercial institutions [4, 43, 54].
Research honeypots
Research honeypots are deployed with the intention to study about the black-
hat community. Their main purpose is to learn in a detailed manner about
the threats the organization’s network face rather than security enforcement.
By using this types of honeypot an organization can learn more about where
the attacks are originated, the way they organize, tools and tactics that they
used to attack etc [4]. These types of honeypots are highly used by research
and universities institution to learn more about cyber threats. Examples of
such setup is The Georgia Tech Honeynet at Georgia University which was
established during the summer of 2002 and Brigham Young University secu-
rity engineering lab for undergraduate and graduate students called ITSecLab
[55, 56]. Honeynet is an example of this type of honeypots [4, 54]. Though
honeypots are classified based on their purpose, but they can also serve as
research and production honeypots as their distinction is not absolute.
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2.6.3 Honeypot by Deployment
Physical honeypot usually refers to high-interaction honeypots where a real
system with its own IP is intentionally made vulnerable to be compromised
completely. Setting up physical honeypot is time consuming and expensive.
Like their setting up maintaining them is not easy either [54]. Virtual honeypot
refers to deploying a honeypot using a virtual machine with the help of virtu-
alization technology. This approach gives more benefit due to the advantages
provided by virtual technologies such as inexpensive to deploy, scalability and
simplicity of maintenance [16, 54]. More than one honeypot can be deployed
on a single physical machine which all can share the physical hardware the
host and in case of public IP shortage in deploying, they can be assigned a
private IP that can be accessed via NAT or bridge from the Internet.
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2.6.4 Honeypot by Architecture
Traditionally the deployment of honeypots have been server-side based. How-
ever, in recent years client-side based side honeypots have evolved. Unlike
the server-side based honeypots which wait to be attacked, client side honey-
pots crawl on the internet to find servers that have malicious contents [21, 57].
Capture-HPC is an example of High-interaction honeyclients that crawls to
visit web pages [58]. An example of low-interaction client honeypot is Hon-
eyC which is open source and works with various platforms. It was developed
in Ruby programming language [59].
2.7 Literature Review
In the last decade honeypots have been actively used to perform network secu-
rity related research works [1]. Under this section previous relevant research
works to this project are summarized.
”Experiment using Distributed High-Interaction Honeynet (D2H)” [60]
The research was conducted by setting up honeypots on Amazon clouds and
locally at Oslo And Akershus University College Of Applied Science. The re-
search focused on identifying similarities and differences among regional and
global attacks, which type of honeypot setup yields more information about
attackers and their tactics, pros and cons of honeypot setup and data collec-
tion as well analysing in supporting for effective network security setup [60].
The honeypots deployed on Amazon clouds were made to send their logs to
a source log server hosted on the premises of HiOA for further analysis. This
was a precaution to save information deletion in case a honeypot was compro-
mised by an adversary. Setting up a fully fledged honeypots on the Amazon
cloud was not achieved due to privilege restriction in place from the service
provider. However, useful data have been retrieved from this set up [60].
The research was focused on SSH and Web service attacks and it used Debian
Squeeze operating system in all the honeypots deployed. The paper stated Se-
bek a key logging feature of Honeynet was not successfully installed though a
reasonable amount of time was spent on it. The research concluded with some
future works which could further be explored. It has stated that though in-
stallation of Sebek client was not successful but having key logger tools within
the deployment of honeypots will result in learning more about attackers [60].
The experiment was only conducted on one operating system and with only
two services, expanding it to learn more about different types of attack and
attacker’s behaviour under different platforms and against various services
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is worth investigating as every OS flavour has its advantages over the other
which makes it to be preferable to run some applications and services as well
each service has its own value from adversary and organization point of inter-
est [60].
”A comparative study of attacks against Corporate IIS and Apache Web Servers”
[61]
The research work was designed to verify the suggestion that saying Win-
dows operating systems based servers are particularly targeted by cyber ad-
versaries. To verify the claim, the research studied a particular vector of at-
tack. It is specifically designed to investigate the attractiveness of Web servers
to hackers. The web servers software that have be deployed in this research
was Apache web server which is a leading Linux web server and IIS Microsoft
web server [61]. The project had no intention in testing the security level of
the operating systems under use, but only to investigate if the IIS web server
system attracts more attackers than that of Apache web server systems [61].
Both web server systems in this project were configured to simulate financial
services websites. The two systems were web pages were identically config-
ured and provide identical data. The only difference among the systems were
the server headers. Network services that were allowed in the firewall in this
project were only HTTP web service at port 80 and HTTPS at port 443. Any
other network traffic to other services were blocked by the firewall [61].
Using this setup the research work answered which of the two systems got
most vulnerability scan and on which system did attackers spend more time
to compromise the system. There were two honeynets deployed in this exper-
iment. Each honeynet had two fictitious financial web sites that were running
under VMWare environment [61]. The data analysis on the research work was
conducted on the average number of individual source IP addresses that at-
tacked IIS and Apache. The research was conducted on two phases and in
both phases Apache web servers were found to be less attractive to attackers
than IIS web servers. The researcher suggested this could be due to the wide
market penetration of W32 and from the perception of high security level in
Linux systems than that of Windows. The researcher also highlighted that the
research work does not demonstrate the security level of Linux or Microsoft
Windows [61].
Some of the future works that the research highlighest are installing Apache on
Windows server and run similar test to see if attackers avoid Apache installed
on Windows than Apache on Linux servers. One another potential research
area suggested by the author is to study why is Linux less attractive [61].
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”Implementation of high interaction honeypot to analyze the network traffic
and prevention of attacks on protocolo/port basis” [11]
This research work was first conducted at PUNJAB TECHNICAL UNIVER-
SITY JALANDHAR, PUNJAB in INDIA in the year 2012 and in January 2013
it was published on International Journal of Computer Applications [11].
The objective of the research experiment was to set up low and high interaction
honeypots, analyze traffic captured and detect attacks on protocol basis. The
research had deployed Windows XP SP2 and Ubuntu 11.04 for executing the
experiment. The paper gave some informative guide on how to setup honeyd
which is a low-interaction honeypot and Honeywall that is the gateway and
the core deployment of setting up honeynet.The paper had claimed the same
challenge about Sebek client installation as that of [60].
After the successful deployment of the honeynet, four flooding attacks were
launched via hping3 which is a command-line oriented TCP/IP packet ana-
lyzer. The three attacks launched were aimed in observing and analyzing the
consequences of the attacks on the walleye interface and the fourth attack was
to learn how Sebek reacts and log the keystrokes [11].
Some of the papers reviewed throughout the time of this project claimed dif-
ficulties while setting up honeypot projects but they did not document how
they solved the problem which could help other researches. However, [11] has
precisely outlined the challenges faced during the setup process and how they
were solved in a step by step instruction. The open source community is based
up on the contribution of each individual or group that uses the open source
products and a minor contribution has a tremendous impact on this commu-
nity [11].
As the attacks were launched by the same researchers that have deployed the
honeypot, it might not give much information about cyber criminals. How-
ever, the research was one of the good guides for learning about honeypot
setup and testing for newbie in deploying honeypot before launching it online.
”Experiences with a Generation III Virtual Honeynet” [54]
The IT infrastructure is exposed to a daily assault due to the incredible ma-
licious activities that exists in today’s internetworked world. Organization’s
assets are continuously probed by cyber criminals for different motives via dif-
ferent exploit mechanisms the likes of worms, virus, DDOS attacks etc. There
are different tools in place to counter for online malicious activities such as
firewall and IDS. However, these tools have known shortages to deal with the
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dynamical change of tools, techniques and skill levels of the cyber criminals.
These tools are more of defensive tools and they are passive in nature as their
functionality depends on predefined rules and signatures which make them of
no use when it comes to detecting or protecting for a new attacks[54].
Honeypot is not aimed at solving organization’s network security dilemma.
However, it is designed to learn about threats an organization network faces
and how to improve network security by analyzing the data that is collected
from the honeypot. The research utilized the benefits of virtualization technol-
ogy by deploying multiple Ubuntu servers over a physical machine. The pre-
ferred virtualization technology on this research was VMware solution. A vir-
tual high-interaction honeypot known virtual honeynet was deployed to study
about attacks between September 2008 and November 2008 [54]. Like any
other software honeynet is also in continuous development process. There-
fore since its introduction by The Honeynet project in 1999 as Generation one,
it has reached the third generations by improving the shortages identified on
this generation and on generation two. Honeywall gateway in the first genera-
tion required one interface to connect to the Internet and one to the honeypot.
The third generation of honeynet adopted the architectural design of second
generation, but improvement was made in deployment and management of
Honeywall which is the core element in Honeynet and unlike the previous ver-
sion the installation has been made much easier by creating a Honeywall Roo
that is a CD ROM that includes snort, snort inline, Argus, tcpdump, hflow2,
walleye interface and Sebek server [54].
This research used virtual honeynet by installing Honeywall Roo and on the
specified research period of time was able to collect 30,000 attacks against the
network and these attacks were categorized based on ports and services as
well source IP alongside country of origin. According to this research the first
successful attack was after four days and was via SSH brute force attack [54].
The research was conducted at the School of Engineering and Advanced Tech-
nology (SEAT) Massey University in New Zealand and used free or open source
products only specifically Ubuntu server. According to the research paper in-
stallation of Sebek client was succeful unlike [11] and [60], but its installation
step was not document. The paper conclude with a future work on comparing
Honeynet at different virtualization environment and enhancing the data col-
lection method via automation[54].
”Comparative Survey of Local Honeypot Sensors to Assist Network Foren-
sics” [62]
The paper demonstrates the usefulness and impact of locally experimented re-
searches in making global statistical decision and learning the difference and
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similarities of attack trends in network security by deploying low-interaction
honeypots over several locations and comparing them based on some param-
eters to conclude about abnormal and particular activities. The research is
conducted from volunteers as part of an academic project started by deploy-
ing high-interaction honeynet in each research site. However as the number of
interested volunteers increased the deployment of high-interaction honeypot
created difficulties. Unlike low-interaction honeypot the deployment of high-
interaction honeypot is time consuming and has more risk not only that but
the hard restriction imposed by their implementation and as each site differ
its capacity to provide specific requirements might not be logical which will
have an impact on statistical preciseness [62]. Another foreseeable challenge
in deploying high-interaction honeypots is that their deployment involves real
system and services configuration and on the process of deployment due to
different people participated on the project with different competence miscon-
figuration is highly expected which could have its own impact on the credibil-
ity of the data collected. Therefore, the research team decided to use Honeyd
a low-interaction honeypot as it emulates systems and services. Installation of
sensor image and configuration files of Honeyd was automated from central
station so each site will have the same configuration setup. The only require-
ment from an individual site with this approach is only one physical machine.
Project participants have been given access to the central database where in-
formation is stored [62].
On this basis statistical analysis of attack origin, attackers OS, attack timing per
day, attacker’s domain, port probes were analyzed for two voluntarily partici-
pant sensors located in an academic network in France and academic network
in Taiwan which had the same configuration and setup and run for the same
period of time. As the result revealed by the research the Taiwanese sensor
were targeted by several specific attacks which brought the attention of The
Ministry of Education (MOE) of Taiwan to introduced Information Security
Management System (ISMS) address the issue [62].
”Detection and Characterization of Port Scan Attacks” [63]
The complexity of Internet design had played a role in increasing the way
weakness can be misused. Attacks to the network systems can be executed via
vulnerabilities within services, applications, OS, misconfiguration etc. Port
scanning is one the popular mechanism used to find a vulnerable host on the
internet [63]. Communication between the attacking machine and the target
machine starts by sending a message at a specific port from the attacker’s ma-
chine and wait to get a feedback from the target machine. From the response
the attacker can learn relevant host information which will help the intruder
to identify what kind of attack to launch [63].
The research work was aimed in analyzing and characterizing port scanning
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traffic. The research developed a set of heuristics which was applied to trace
network data. With the help of these data identifying and grouping suspicious
packets were achieved and were used to retrieve relevant port scanning traffic
statistics [63].
There are a range of tools that are used to scan port on the network. Nmap
(Network Mapper) is one of the most known free and open source scanning
tool that is able to retrieve a detailed information about hosts in a network
with the services as well their version, types of firewalls in use, OS etc. Port
scan can cause a various challenges to a network such as wasting resources,
network obstruct, paving away for future attack [63].
Port scan was define for the paper of the research as all anomalous messages
sent from a unique source IP at a time of trace with this port scan was cate-
gorized into vertical-targeting more than one port at a single host, horizontal-
targeting identical ports on various hosts, block-a combination of vertical and
horizontal. Based on their predefined criteria 9927 vertical scans, 5623 hor-
izontal scans, and 2008 block scans observations were made. However, the
research have seen some abnormality between vertical and horizontal scans
that could be explored and more researches on Port scan traffic needed to be
conduct were the paper’s conclusion [63].
Similar statistical techniques can be applied to perform this project and as the
research paper claimed there was little data set during experiment, so explor-
ing this as extension of this project could be carried out.
”A Review of Port Scanning Techniques” [64]
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) main
protocols belong to transport layer of the TCP/IP suite [13, 30] The report pa-
per was dedicated in analyzing port scanning techniques specifically on tech-
niques used by TCP port scanners. Knowledge about the existing port scan-
ning techniques will a network and system administrator an upper hand how
to deal with them. The paper gave an explanatory about TCP segment with
the six flag bits which are Synchronize (SYN) the first flag in initiating legiti-
mate three-way handshake connection, FIN flag that tells the data sending is
finished, RST a flag that tells the connection to reset, an urgent pointer which
is represented by URG, ACK flag that confirms data was received and PSH
flag that inform the receiver to send the data to the application level as fast as
possible [64] .
The paper continues its elaboration on the most used TCP scanning techniques
which are TCP connect() that is a scanning technique that is carried out by
completing the three-way handshake connection establishment mechanism
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used by TCP to figure out the status of the service on network systems and
the other most used techniques in TCP scanning is TCP SYN scanning which
initiates the connection to a target system by sending SYN packet as if to ex-
ecute a legitimate TCP connection, but based on the reply from the target the
scanning host will be aware if the target is listening or not. If a target host is
listening it will send a SYN/ACK packet to confirm that it real does listen but
if RST packet is been sent, it means that the port is not in listening state. How-
ever, if the scanning host send RST if it receive SYN/ACK from the target host
as from start the intention was not to establish a real connection but to just find
out the status of the service. The paper also provide more information about
indirect, stealth, fragmented, decoy and coordinated scanning techniques [64].
The paper has provided a good insight about the types of TCP scanning which
are helpful in understanding the theoretical aspect of the scanning mechanism.
”Fast Portscan Detection Using Sequential Hypothesis Testing” [65]
The research was conducted in MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelli-
gence Laboratory. Network systems are being continuously probed daily by
intruders to get illegitimate access to systems. The paper noted that devising
an effective algorithm for port scanning is not yet been an easy task due var-
ious reasons as it is hard to easily identify what attempt is malicious or not.
The other issue the paper raised as a reason for port scanning detection is that
the granularity of identity meaning that how we categorize probes. The paper
does not ignore the existence of some port scan detection mechanism, but ad-
mitted also the shortage in the existing solution in quality and quantity [65].
The research was aiming to address the problem of prompt detection. The
algorithm was developed based on the assumption that if any non-useful con-
nection from any host will be considered as a scan. Due to the sites volun-
teered to test the algorithm were using Bro NIDS, the researches algorithm
was designed to fit on the Bro algorithm. The two sites involved in testing
the algorithm were LBL and ICSI which are research laboratories with 6000
and 200 hosts respectively. The research had collected six dataset where each
dataset covers 24 hour period. All the dataset used to test the algorithm was
TCP connection summary found from the two sites [65].
The research developed an online detection algorithm Threshold Random Walk
(TRW) which was then compare to Bro and Snort to measure it performance
level. The paper claimed TRW has the advantage over Snort in its analysis as it
is not dependent in window of time. The future work of this research includes
how TRW can be able to respond, evasion and gaming, currently TRW can
receive limited information which needs to improve, managing state meaning
tracking every source host [65]. The paper has provide a guide to carry out
hypothetical statistics while giving some clarification about port scan identifi-
cation techniques.
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”Learning More About Attack Patterns With Honeypots” [2]
Almost all human daily activities have become heavily dependent on com-
puter systems. This is a proof by itself how far that this industry has come
since its innovation. However, the threats against these systems have also in-
creased almost at equal level. Network systems are flooded with bulk email
(spam), virus, worms, malware, hacking to systems etc are also become part of
the daily life of computer systems. Therefore, learning about network systems
weakness and how they can be exploited by cyber adversaries is non stoppable
journey [2].
Honeypot is a decoy computer that is intentionally made vulnerable to be com-
promised by cyber adversaries in order to learn about tactic, methods and mo-
tives of the intruders. Honeypot can be deployed on a local network to study
about attacks against that specific network or environment, but this might not
give security personnel wide image about the global attacking phenomena.
Therefore, the research group decided to participate on the globally distributed
honeypot project called lurre.com [2]. The main idea behind this project was to
collect attack related data from different geographically located networks and
store each data from a particular censor on database which can be accessible by
any participant via access permission. The data collected at one center could
be used by other member of the project which enable the participant to com-
pare and contrast the attack behaviour against the locally observed behaviours
[2].
The research carries out some statistical analysis based on the collected data
from the experiment. Based on the statistical analysis the average number of
attack sources per day was 184.94 and 2022 was the maximum attack source
observed on this project. Attack source refers on this project as the source IP
address that carries out attack on target system. Though, there is a clear vari-
ation on the source IP per day collected but the research group has stated that
the reason is not certain but it could be due to receiving many packets from
broken systems that uses NAT. The other statistical analysis that this research
paper produced based on comparison on six censors was that Windows op-
erating system was heavily used by source attacks comparing other operating
system platforms. The research experiment was conduct for six months and
the total attack source was 153,791 and this was further categorized based on
IP address related to country using Maxmind GeoIP and the result shows the
majority source attack were from USA at 24 % of all the attack source followed
by china and Germany with 18% and 7% respectively. On port basis the anal-
ysis showed that TCP ports 135 and 445 had received the highest number of
connection [2].
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Chapter 3
Approach and Methodology
The initial step in caring out a research is to set up a well defined experimen-
tal laboratory which will play a great role in the success and fairness of the
final outcome. To carry out this experiment virtual high-interaction honeypot
will be deployed. Unlike low-interaction honeypot which limits attackers by
emulating services, high-interaction honeypot provides the attacker with real
service and OS [66]. Once an attacker compromised a system more detailed
information will be collected through implementation of high-interaction hon-
eypot which can be stored for further analysis. Though implementing high-
interaction honeypot is time consuming, as it should look like a real produc-
tion system in order to deceive the hacker, the time spent on implementing it
is worth the information that can be collected about the hacker’s activities [11].
On this project an automation installation script that was developed using
kickstart as an assignment in system administration II course will be modified
and used to ease the challenges of setting up high-interaction honeynet. The
other challenge with such honeypots is that the risk it involves as the hacker is
provided with real OS and services, a compromised system might be used to
attack other legitimate systems in a network [60]. Therefore, attentive precau-
tion needs to be taken. Honeynet, a high-interaction honeypot, was designed
with this security concern in mind by the honeynet project. Therefore, out-
going network traffic from the honeypots will be controlled and set to a limit
at the honeynet gateway. The implementation of high-interaction honeynet
as a standalone research tool or in combination with low-interaction or with
medium interactions honeypot had yielded a good result in learning about the
ever growing cyber-attack [11, 54, 60, 62]. The subsections below will give de-
tailed insight about the whole architectural setup, virtual environment choice,
hardware and software specifications, security measures, data collection, hy-
pothesis testing and analysis that will be carried out in this project.
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3.1 Architectural Platform
The term platform is used in diverse ways which is tricky to reconcile but Ox-
ford English Dictionary defines it as a raised level surface on which people or
things can stand, usually a discrete structure intended for a particular activity
or operation. As mentioned in 2.6.3 Honeynet can be deployed in a physical
or virtual platforms. The challenges of deploying physical honeypot has also
being outlined on the same section. Therefore, this project will be carried out
on virtual environment.
3.1.1 Virtual High Interaction Honeypot
One of the greatest achievements in the computers industry is the golden
invention of running multiple different operating systems within one single
physical machine. Though the popularity of virtualization has created more
attentions in the last few decades but its history goes way back to 1960s [67].
Setting up virtual honeypot has several advantages as stated on the book titled
” Virtual Honeypots From Botnet Tracking to Intrusion Detection” by Niels
Provos and THorsten Holz. Virtual honeypots are cost effective, scalable, easy
to manage and simply portable, in case they get compromised, as they are files
[67]. This is one of the many reasons for choosing the experiment be performed
on virtual machines than physical ones. There are several free and open source
virtualization solution to choose from like the free version of Vmware, Xen,
User-Mode Linux, Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM), Proxmox etc. and
there are commercial virtualization solutions. Kernel-based Virtual Machine
(KVM) will be used on this project because the author is fairly familiar with
the product.
3.2 Experiment Design
The network setup for this experiment will be designed as shown in figure
3.1. There will be sixteen honeypots grouped into two and they will be de-
ployed on two physical machines. Both groups will be deployed on the same
infrastructure in order to avoid any biased results.
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Figure 3.1: Network setup
3.2.1 Kernel-Based Virtual Machine (KVM)
As mentioned above, the preferred virtualization technology for this project
will be KVM. KVM is a virtualization technology which allows different oper-
ating systems to run on a physical machine concurrently. These different un-
modified images of Linux or Windows operating system images can run as in-
dividual physical machine with its own network card, disk, graphics adapter,
etc. KVM virtualization supports Intel-VT and AMD-V processor technolo-
gies. For this project Intel-VT based processor will be used [68].
Virtual machines under KVM can be created via graphical user interface or
command line. In this project after the basic installation of via kickstart the
rest of the installation will be done via graphical user interface. Each physical
machine or host will be configured to enable every virtual machine to access
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Internet on its own public IP address so as to directly connect the honeynet
with the Internet. This will be achieved by configuring bridge networking on
the host and make the virtual machines use the bridge interface while they are
been created.
3.3 Hardware and Software Setup
Section 3.2 described how the architectural design will look like. This section
will describe first the hardware and then software that made up the design.
The three physical server machines that will be used on this project are Dell
PowerEdge 2950. Table 3.1 illustrates the physical server specification.
Physical Server Model Speed Memory OS NIC
Dell PowerEdge
2950
(Honeywall
Gateway)
Intel(R) Xeon(R)
Quad Core E5335
2.00 GHz 4 GB Centos
Roo-1.4 Honey-
wall CDROM
3 Used
Dell PowerEdge
2950
(Virtual Hon-
eynet 1)
Intel(R) Xeon(R)
Quad Core E5335
2.00 GHz 32 GB Ubuntu
12.04.1 LTS
x86 64 (64 bit)
2
Used only 1
Dell PowerEdge
2950
(Virtual Hon-
eynet 2)
Intel(R) Xeon(R)
Quad Core E5335
2.00 GHz 32 GB Ubuntu
12.04.1 LTS
x86 64 (64 bit)
2
Used only 1
Table 3.1: Physical Machines Hardware Specifications
All virtual machines that will be deployed on this research experiment will
have the same hardware and software setup but they will be using two differ-
ent open source operating systems. Each virtual honeynet group will be have
eight virtual machines where four virtual machines with Centos operating sys-
tem installed and four Ubuntu operating system installed. Table 3.2 shows one
from each virtual machine specification for demonstration purpose.
Virtual Environment Model Speed Memory OS Virtual NIC
KVM GenuineIntel 2.00 GHz 4 GB Centos
5.9 i686
Virtio
(Bridged
by br0)
KVM GenuineIntel 2.00 GHz 4 GB Ubuntu
10.04.4 LTS i686
Virtio
(Bridged
by br0)
Table 3.2: Virtual Machines Hardware Specifications
The application software that will be installed on each virtual machine will be
identical in order to avoid any biased attack attraction due to the vulnerabili-
ties that exists within specific application on honeypot. A through investiga-
tion about known software vulnerabilities will be conducted and they will be
installed on the honeypots. For example if version 2.11.10.1 of phpMyAdmin ,
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an open source software which is developed via PHP programming language
to administer MySQL, is installed on one virtual machine that is running Cen-
tos operating system in group Virtual Honeynet 1, the same application will be
installed on another Centos honeypot that is categorized under Virtual Hon-
eynet 2. Though this comparison is not paired comparison but any biased
installation might have an impact on the outcome. Therefore, careful instal-
lation will be given high priority. The software that will be installed on the
honeypots will be chosen based on known vulnerabilities that are listed un-
der public knowledge by information security vulnerabilities databases such
as Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), Open Sourced Vulnerability
Database (OSVDB), National Vulnerability Database and US-CERT.
3.4 Security and Honeywall Gateway
Compromised honeypots can be used to cause a severe damage to other le-
gitimate systems on the network. Safeguarding other legitimate systems on
the network should be given high priority [42]. While conducting this experi-
ment, implementing a mechanism to reduce the damage that can result from a
compromised system within this project is a priority. Therefore, the latest ver-
sion of Honeywall CDROM also known as Roo-1.4 which is based on Centos
operating system that uses a full hardware of a machine will be installed to
act as defense mechanism against any serious harm that could take place on
legitimate system as a result of any compromised honeypot from this project.
Based on the documentation of The Honeywall Project, the machine that is go-
ing to host the Honeywall gateway should have two atleast network interface
cards. This means the possibility of managing the server from remote area is
not possible [69]. One of the physical machines will be dedicated for Hon-
eywall CDROM. The machine will have three network interfaces as shown on
the figure Network Setup. One interface will be used to connect the Honeywall
CDROM to the internet that will be the eth0 of the machine, the second inter-
face that is the eth1 will be used to connect the honeypots to the Honeywall
CDROM so that they will be able to connect to Internet while every activity
from and to them is monitored and logged and the third interface named eth2
will be used for accessing the Honeywall web page and remote logging via
SSH from allowed remote IP addresses. One of the aims of the Honeywall
CDROM development by the Honeynet Project is to protect damages from
compromised honeypots to legitimate systems. The machine that will host the
CDROM roo image will be configured to act as a firewall gateway in order
to monitor and control all network traffic to and from the honeypots. Out-
going network traffic will be limited per hour, but incoming network traffic
to the services that will be monitored are going to be allowed. Any outgoing
connection that exceed the limit will be dropped at the Honeywall gateway
to avoid suspicion by intruders and dropped connections will not be reported
to the sender. Successful attack will be reported to a given email address of
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the author. This e-mail is going to be checked constantly in order to follow the
progress of successful attacks and take necessary action when all the necessary
information is gathered. The Honeywall gateway will be invisible to the out-
side world.
The Honeywall CDROM is a bootable high-interaction honeynet which is com-
prised of variety of network security tools that can help in data capture, control
and analysis developed by the Honeywall Project [69]. In this project these fea-
tures will also be utilized to get data that can help to answer the problem state-
ment. Honeywall CDROM is also capable of logging keystrokes by installing
client side of Sebek on the honeypot and configure them to send their log files
via a dedicated UDP port to Sebek server which is installed while installing
the operating system. Data collected can also be analyzed at the graphical web
interface or in depth analysis can be via other tools like Ethreal or Wireshark
as the data are saved in pcap format. The following section briefly explains the
component of Honeywall gateway and their applicability [52, 69].
• Sebek Server: the server side used to accept and log keystrokes sent from
Sebek client (honeypots).
• Snort: logs packets at reał-time and can be used to perform analysis
based on content or probe.
• Snort inline: a modified version of snort which accepts packets from ipt-
ables.
• Tcpdump: logs network traffic in .pcap format which can be read and
analyzed with network analyzing tools such as Wireshark.
• Walleye Web Interface: will be used to remotely administer, configure
and analyze data on daily bases.
3.5 Data Collection
The data that are needed to address the problem statement of this research will
mainly be collected from the log files of the services that are deployed in the
sixteen honeypots that are grouped into two. The data collection process will
be done via Perl scripts that run every mid night of each day during the project
life time. The retrieved data will be labelled based on the identification created
for each honeypot and grouped to the group it belongs. All data will be iso-
lated and secured to avoid any data corruption. The aim of this research is to
find out if network attacks target attractive FQDN than non-attractive FQDN.
To address the problem statement the data that will be collected from the log
files are source IP address, source port, destination IP, destination port, initial
and final timestamps related to source IP addresses and number of attempts
each source IP address made at a particular service.
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The number of connections attempts a unique source IP address made to each
honeypot will be used to address which services are more probed and find out
if there is a difference in magnitude in attempting to break-in systems with
attractive domain names than non-descriptive domain name.
Honeywall gateway logs any network traffic from and to the honeypots from
the launch date to the end of the project on hourly bases for each day [51].
These data provides information about the traffic that have been trespassing
through it to and from honeypots, attackers OS, attackers origin etc. For this
project the log files of server will be used to retrieve attackers information
such as attackers country of origin, OS used by attackers. Attackers coun-
try of origin will then be compared to the country of origin of the attackers
retrieved via perl script from www.Dshield.org and http://www.geoiptool.
com/ databases.
The data collected by the Honeywall gateway is stored in pcap format [51].
This needs to be converted to comma separated values (csv) format which will
be able to be read and computed by script to retrieve the required information.
This file can be easily imported to Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and RStudio for
statistical calculation and graphing for the purpose of analysis.
The purpose of this research is to verify the claim that hosts with attractive
fully qualified domain name are more attacked than hosts with non-attractive
fully qualified domain name. To address the problem statement of this re-
search, two groups of IP addresses where each group has eight public IPs that
can be accessed directly from the Internet will be deployed. The information
to be collected in this project from the Honeywall gateway specifically is the
inbound connection in order to analyze network connection made to a spe-
cific destination IP from unique source IP on daily, weekly and throughout
the project duration . These data will be categorized and labeled according to
where they are being retrieve from and also grouped accordingly.
SANS Technology Institute had developed Internet Storm Center (ISC)that is
used to collect and monitor malicious Internet activity. ISC uses the DShield
distributed intrusion detection system for data collection and analysis. DShield
collects data about malicious activity from across the Internet. This data is cat-
aloged and summarized and can be used to discover trends in activity, confirm
widespread attacks, or assist in preparing better firewall rules [70]. To address
question four of the problem statement a perl script will be developed to check
the malicious nature of the source IP addresses. Another script will also be de-
veloped to retrieve country of origin of the source IP addresses.
The data which will be collected will be stored on daily basis and labeled based
on the identification created for each honeypot and grouped to where they be-
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long accordingly. All data will be isolated and secured to avoid any data cor-
ruption.
Data collection for research purpose are often categorized into quantitative
and qualitative. The aim of quantitative data collection is to test the hypothesis
while qualitative is to understand social interactions [71]. The authors of the
book titled Interactive Statistics Martha A. and Brenda G. has defined quantita-
tive research as ”Explaining phenomena by collecting numerical data that are
analyzed using mathematically based methods (in particular statistics)” [71].
The definition makes it clear and understood that the research of this project
falls under that category. The authors of [72] argued that quantitative research
does not accept evolution methodology. That means data collection for such
research should be identical and should be retrieved at all time of the collec-
tion period of time.
Inaccurate data collection will influence the final result of a research [71]. In
this project inaccuracy of data collection can arise if there is a time delay in
replacing any honeypot that is taken down after it has been compromised in
order to prevent any harm that could emanate from it to other legitimate sys-
tems. To avoid this phenomenon the implementation of each machine that
runs Centos or Ubuntu operating system will be the same throughout the
project by taking clone from each honeypot’s operating system after its ini-
tial installation is completed. This clone will immediately replace any similar
honeypot in case there is a need to take it down after it has been compro-
mised. One of the reasons of running virtual honeypot in this project is that
there should not be any delay of replacing a compromised honeypot as it could
lead to a biased data collection process which will make the final decision to
be unfair and biased as well. This means that there will eight virtual machines
for each group that will run 24/7 throughout the project.
Any data from compromised honeypot will be stored in a secure environment
for later analysis to avoid any malware replication. Backup of all the daily data
will also be taken and stored at another machine which will not be accessible
by other users or over the Internet. All data from the Honeywall gateway and
the honeypots will be labeled hourly and on a daily basis with an identification
in order to segregate them according to where they are retrieved from and
they will be used for further analysis to address the problem statement of this
project.
3.6 Hypothesis Testing
The reason behind any data collection to investigate if there is evidence to sup-
port the research hypothesis [71]. In order to address the problem statement
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statistical approach is required after collecting the data. Describing all the sta-
tistical approaches is not the intention of this project however the approach
that will be used to answer the problem statement of this research work is go-
ing to be highlighted.
One type of statistical inference is hypothesis testing. Hypothesis testing is a
systematic method of testing a research hypothesis about population from a
sample [73]. Final conclusion about the population’s parameter is made based
on test carried out on the sample. The test is carried out to verify the uncertain
assumption made by a researcher about parameter or distribution [3, 74]. The
assumption that is made by the researcher is known as null hypothesis and is
denoted by H0. The competing hypothesis to the null hypothesis is known as
alternative hypothesis and is denoted by Ha [73].
Hypothesis testing involves stating the research question, specify the null and
alternative hypothesis, calculating the test statistic, compute probability of test
statistic and make conclusion whether there is an evidence to support the re-
search hypothesis. The research hypothesis can be accepted or rejected de-
pending on the result of the experiment. If the null hypothesis is rejected based
on the experiment, then the alternative hypothesis is true [74, 73].
The final outcome of the test is based on the sample drawn from the entire
population which makes the researcher to expect of a possibility of error in the
outcome. Due to this consideration there is type I and type II errors in hypoth-
esis testing. Rejecting a true null hypothesis is type I error and failing to reject
a false null hypothesis is type II error. The decision relies on the p-value which
is the probability value, from the sample data. The test will be conducted at
some significance level or alpha. The common used significance levels 90%,
95% and 99% [74, 73]. Often hypothesis testing is done in the scientific world
to compare two groups in order to determine if there is a significant difference
between them based to a given comparison criteria or variable. Hypothesis
testing can be one and two tailed alternative hypotheses [73].
Test statistic is a mathematical approach that helps to determine whether the
null hypothesis is true or not [74]. As this thesis work is to compare data from
two groups IP addresses and find out the impact of attractive fully qualified
domain name in making a computer more targeted by attackers as compared
to non-attractive fully qualified domain name. Therefore, the two-independent-
samples t-test will be used to compare the results of the data collected.
The means and the standard deviations are very crucial while comparing two
independent groups. Two comparable groups are called independent if there
is no relation between the objects in the groups even if they are drawn from the
same population [73]. For example taken random sample result of second year
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female and male students from a university and compare their grades. Though
both groups are from the same population which is second year university
students in this case, but their results are not dependent. In such scenario one-
sample test is not applicable to test the null hypothesis as the two groups are
not dependent. Therefore, two-independent-sample t test is used to compare
the difference between the two independent means [75, 73].
In this project the test computation will be done via an open source statisti-
cal computing program RStudio and Microsoft Excel as the author is familiar
with the software. However, to manually calculate t test for two independent
sample test by hand is shown below.
t =
Mx −My√
S2x
nx
+
S2y
ny
S2 = ∑
(x−M)2
n− 1
• Mx refers to the first mean
• My refers to second mean
• Sx refers to sample standard deviation (variance) of the first group
• Sy refers to sample standard deviation (variance) of the second group
• n refers to sample size
• x and y refers to the individual scores
3.7 Data Analysis
The idea of setting up honeypot is to collect data which will be used to create
knowledge so as to enhance the defense mechanism against abuse of computer
network. If collected data cannot be analyzed effectively and correctly, the
value and power of knowledge that would have been generated from it will
diminish. The data collected in this project will be labeled in order to statisti-
cally analyzed them based on time stamp, source IP, source port, destination
IP and destination port and group them according to which group they belong.
Based on the data collected from the log files and the Honeywall gateway the
statistically computed result will be analyzed to interpret the findings of this
research. Analysis will be done to accept or nullify the claim that says attrac-
tive fully qualified domain name are not targeted more than non-attractive
fully qualified domain names”. The other analysis will be done on the results
on the information retrieved about the source IP addresses to answer the last
question of the problem statement.
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3.8 Wireshark
Wireshark is an open source network packet sniffer and analyzer tool which
can be installed and run in various operating systems. Packet sniffer in com-
puter networking refers to a tool that can help to capture network traffic.
Packet analyzer is a tool with the capability to analyze the captured data. Wire-
shark has GUI and can be accessed via Tshark from a command line. It is ca-
pable of capturing live network packets and also can read previously captured
files. Wireshark captures files in libpcap format the same as Tcpdump which
is a command line network analyzer. Wireshark can be queried to filter from
captured files such by protocol basis [76].
The log file stored in Honeywall gateway are stored in pcap format which can
be read by Wireshark. This file can then be converted to other format via Wire-
shark [76]. Though with the huge amount of data captured by the Honeywall
gateway about the network traffic to and from the honeynets this might not
be a wise idea but still considering the challenges that arise in data collection
and analyzing using the visual aspect will give a direction how to go about it.
Wireshark will be used in this project to do some analysis as well.
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Chapter 4
Results
This section is dedicated to the actual lab setup and the results obtained from
the experiment. As mentioned in section 1.2 the main aim of this experiment is
to verify if attractive FQDN will be more targeted than non-attractive FQDN
by cyber adversaries. Therefore, setting up what is proposed in the above
section enabled to execute the research.
4.1 Actual Test bed Setup
The integral part of any research that deploys high-interaction honeynet is the
Honeywall CDROM roo. In this project version 1.4 is installed in a dedicated
server with the specification that was shown in 3.1. Unlike version 1.3, this
version is developed on Centos Operating system as its base and its installa-
tion processes have been simplified by making graphically installable [69]. The
server has three network interface card where eth0 and eth1 are configured in
a bridge networking mode. This hides the server from outside world while
monitoring each activity that goes through it from and to the honeynets. Eth0
is connected to the Internet to allow the honeynets that are connected to the
Honeywall gateway through eth1 to be reachable from outside world while
they are being monitored. The third network interface card which is eth2 is
configured for management purposes at port 22 for remote login via SSH and
securely accessing the Walleye web interface via port 443 only from authorized
IPs. The Honeywall gateway is configured to log every incoming and outgo-
ing activity to and from the honeynets.
The Honeywall gateway encompasses Snort among the other tools. Snort is an
Intrusion detection and prevention system which is able to log packet on real
time and can be used for traffic analysis. It can detect vulnerability exploit at-
tempts, port scans and other malicious network activities. Snort is configured
to log network traffic to and from the honeynets. In this project the log file is
used to retrieve additional information about the unique IP that are logged by
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each honeypot.
As compromised systems could be used by intruders to cause severe harm
to legitimate systems in the Internet, the outbound connection from the hon-
eynets was restricted by protocol bases. Outgoing TCP and UDP connection
from the honeynet are limited to 20 per hour and ICMP connections were lim-
ited to 50 per hour by the firewall equipped within the Honeywall gateway.
Any outgoing connection that exceeds the specified limit is subjected to be
dropped without any alert to the intruder that his or her connection attempts
were dropped by the firewall of the gateway.
The Honeywall gateway is also configured to send alert email to the adminis-
trator of the server when there is a suspected activity. The email was regularly
checked to avoid any serious harm in case there is a compromised honeypot
within this project. Data was collected on daily basis for this project. The web
interface was also regularly checked for any abnormal behaviour of outgoing
network traffic behaviour.
4.2 KVM and Virtual Honeypot Setup
The virtual environment used for this project is KVM. Both physical servers
were equipped with Intel processor and KVM was installed as para-virtualization
hypervisor Ubuntu being the base OS for both physical servers. All the six-
teen virtual machines should be accessible directly from the Internet, both host
servers are configured to act as bridge in order to allow the eight virtual honey-
pots deployed on each host server to share the physical NIC. Creating virtual
machines in KVM can be done via virt-manager which is GUI or command
line via virt-install. The packages that are needed and used to install KVM on
Ubuntu are shown below.
apt-get install qemu-kvm libvirt-bin ubuntu-vm-builder
bridge-utils kvm virt-viewer virt-manager virt-top
After the basic installation via Kickstart, the process of creation virtual ma-
chines in this project is done by the GUI feature of KVM. as only two virtual
honeypots need to be created initially, one with Centos and one with Ubuntu
operating system. They are then cloned to create 8 identical virtual machines
for each OS, which makes 16 virtual honeypots in total hosted by two physi-
cal servers. Each physical server hosted four Centos based and four Ubuntu
based virtual honeypots with the hardware and software specified in table 3.1.
The public IPs addresses assigned to the honeypots are allocated for this project
from the IP pool of Oslo and Akershus University College (HiAO) subnet
128.39.120.0/24. These IP addresses are grouped into two groups. Eight of
them are assigned attractive FQDN while the other eight IP addresses are
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given non-attractive FQDN. All honeypots that have attractive FQDN are grouped
as Virtual Honeynet 2 (VH2) and all honeypots with non-attractive FQDN are
grouped as Virtual Honeynet 1 (VH1).
In order to avoid any biased attack attraction all virtual honeypots are con-
figured with the same application software that have known vulnerabilities
based on the information collected related to network security threats listed
on databases such as Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), Open
Sourced Vulnerability, National Vulnerability Database and US-CERT. After
going through the lists of these databases the following application are in-
stalled in the honeynets. PhpMyAdmin version 2.11.10.1, Roundcube Web-
mail version 0.1, Wordpress version 3.4.0, Joomla version 2.5.3 and version
1.8.3 of GnuCash which is financial accounting software and other application
software that resemble to the honeypots with attractive FQDN. Creating the
same environment of comparison was one task that was carefully carried out
in this project as any difference in setup could lead to biased results. Therefore,
any package that is installed in any machine will be installed in all. All in-
stalled software applications were properly configured and simple web pages
were hosted.
Honeynets are deployed to deceive cyber adversaries by pretending as a real
production system. Though announcing via web crawlers might increase the
number of attacks count but for the purpose of the research the most known
search engines were exclude from crawling the web pages hosted. This is to
minimize the number of count that could result due to search engines. The
excluded search engines are Google, Yahoo, Bing, Baidu Spider, MSN bot etc.
Therefore robot.txt file was edited to exclude the most known web crawlers.
Based on previous research works that were reviewed prior to the installation
of this setup, most commonly used and identified weak username and pass-
word combination are set in order to allow intruders to login via SSH remote
login. Once the actual setup is done the honeynets were launched. The next
section is dedicated to show the result of this project.
4.3 Data Collection Procedure
The core idea of this research is to find out if computer systems with attrac-
tive FQDN will be more attacked than computer systems with non-attractive
FQDN. As mentioned in section 3.5 , information about unique source IP ad-
dresses that attacked the honeypots were collected. This information is re-
trieved from each honeypot log files every mid-night for 70 days. On this
project several Perl scripts were developed to retrieve relevant information
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from log files. Information retrieved includes unique source IP, initial and fi-
nal timestamps, source port, and destination IP address. All scripts that were
used on this project with comments about their purpose and usuage are at-
tached on the appendix section.
The data collection process started Saturday 21st September and ended on Fri-
day 29th November of 2013. Any source IP address attacking a single destina-
tion IP address to one or all of the services that were deployed within it was
counted as one for a particular destination honeypot. Each source IP address
attacked any service within a particular honeypot is also recorded as unique
source IP to that particular service and the number of attempts that particular
source IP address made to each service is also recorded to compare the sever-
ity of attack attempts each honeynet gets per service and to determine which
services are more probed during the 70 days experiment.
For example if source IP address 192.168.0.10 attempted to attack destination
IP 192.168.0.135 on Oct 1 at 02:00:00 and then at the same day at 16:34:45 then
on Oct 20 at 10:23:12 via any type of vulnerability, it was counted as one unique
source IP to the destination IP. The same source IP address was registered per
service level as well. However, the number of trials this unique source IP made
at each service to get illegitimate access is recorded in order to conduct service
level analysis that will help to find out if the severity of attempts will sig-
nificantly differ due to the attractiveness of the FQDN and also to determine
which services are more probed. The results are presented below.
The other data collection step was to retrieve information about the unique
source IP addresses that have attacked the honeynets. The information was
retrieved from the database mentioned in 3.5. The information retrieved from
these database are previous reports about malicious activities of the source IP
from Dshield database and country of origin. From the database of Geo Ip
Tool database is also country of origin of attackers. Based on the information
from these database and the Honeywall gateway information, the country of
the attackers are reported and analysed.
4.4 Number of Attacks per Destination IP
Based on the counting mechanism for unique source IP address illustrated
above, the total number of unique source IP addresses that are found on each
honeypot throughout the project life period are shown on 4.1 and 4.2. Fig-
ures 4.1 and 4.2 represents for the honeypots assigned non-attractive FQDN
and attractive FQDN respectively. The total unique source IP addresses that
attacked VH1 are 2365 and a total of 2395 unique source IP addresses attacked
VH2 during the project life time. The total results found on this experiment
for each honeynet are depicted in 4.3.
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Figure 4.1: Total unique source IP at VH1
Figure 4.2: Total unique source IP at VH2
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Figure 4.3: Total Unique Source IP addresses Attacked VH1 and VH2
During the observation period out of the total unique source IP addresses that
attacked the honeynets, 3682 have attacked both honeynets. While the re-
maining were almost equally divided between the two honeynets, 524 unique
source IP addresses have attacked only VH1 and 554 unique source IP ad-
dresses attacked only VH2. Figure 4.4 illustrates the percentages of attack.
Figure 4.4: Proportion of Unique Source IP Addresses Attacked Honeynet
During the observation period of this project out of the total unique source
IP addresses that attacked VH1, SSH log files have generated the most unique
source IP addresses, 1114 of them. The log files that has contributed the second
most are the apache log files with the count of 622 unique source IP addresses.
The unique source IP addresses that tried to get illegitimate access only via
HTTPS,FTP, MySQL, and SMTP log files were 56, 77, 60 and 42 respectively.
Source IP addresses that attacked both SSH and HTTP were 14. Two source IP
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addresses were observed attacking SSH, HTTP and HTTPS during the period
of observation. The rest of the total unique source IP addresses that attacked
VH1 were seen in all log files which accounted 378.
From the total unique source IP addresses that attacked VH2, most of the at-
tacks were SSH attacks. They generated 1125 of the total source IP addresses
counts. Unique source IP addresses observed attacking only HTTP were 637
counts. While MySQL and SMTP have generated the same unique source IP
addresses counts as that of their counterpart in VH1 that is 60 and 42 respec-
tively. HTTPS and FTP log files have contributed 57 and 78 unique source IP
addresses of the total count in VH2 respectively. Unique source IP addresses
that were observed attacking both SSH and HTTP were 12 and 3 unique source
IP addresses were observed attacking SSH, HTTP and HTTPS in VH2. The to-
tal unique source IP addresses observed attacking all the services with VH2
were the same as that of VH1 that is 378 unique source IP addresses. VH2
has seen 30 more unique source IP addresses than VH1 on the seventy days of
observation.
4.5 Source IP per Destination Port
In computer networking communication between two nodes take place due
to the existence of unique IP addresses and port number. Port numbers are
designated for particular services that run within the computer. Cyber adver-
saries also use these ports to compromise computer systems. As mentioned
in section 4.4 each service that were open and running in this project have
made different contribution to the total count of source IP addresses to the
honeynets. In this section the total number of source IP addresses that at-
tacked each service during the seventy days observation is illustrated. In 4.4
any source IP address that attacked one or more service was counted as one.
Therefore, it is obvious the total unique source IP addresses that is counted in
this section will be higher compared to what is illustrated in that section as
the count in this section is service based not destination based. 1508 source
IP adddresses attacked VH1 via SSH attack while 1520 source IP addresses
tried to compormise VH2 through SSH attack. Web application attacks over
HTTP port 80 were the second most prevalent attack type during the obser-
vation period time. There were 1016 source IP addresses that attacked VH1
and 1030 source IP addresses tried to get illegitimate access at VH2 via HTTP
attack. The source IP addresses that logged at HTTPS were 436 at VH1 and
438 at VH2. FTP log files have recorded 455 for VH1 and 456 for VH2. While
MySql log files have logged 438 in both honeynets and SMTP log files logged
420 unique source IP addresses in both honeynets. Figure 4.5 depicts the total
source IP addresses attacked each service.
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Figure 4.5: Total Unique Source IP Addresses Attacked Each Service
4.6 Connection Attempts
The total number of source IP addresses that attacked each service within
both honeynets have been presented in section 5.2. However, throughout the
project the number of connection attempts to break-in the honeypots were way
bigger than the total unique source IP addresses presented in the above sec-
tion. Because in section 5.2 unique source IP is counted only once no matter
how many times it tried to break-in through a particular service.
The daily average of connection attempts to each service at each group during
the experiment period may give a clear picture about the rigorous attempts
that took place to break-in the honeynets. SSH login attempts were mostly
used to break-in the honeynets during the seventy days observation. On aver-
age there were 606 daily login attempts on VH1 and 612 daily login attempts
on VH2. The daily average attempt on HTTP was 57 to 62 for VH1 and VH2
respectively. The rest of the services on daily average had the same number
of connection attempts for VH1 and VH2. Figure 4.6 depicts the daily aver-
age break-in attempts to the honeynets during the project period. This figure
also depicts which services were most probed in order to get illegitimate ac-
cess.
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Figure 4.6: Daily Average Break-in Attempts per Service at VH1 and VH2
4.7 Unique Source IP per Operating System
As mentioned in section 3.3, in this project Centos version 5.4 and Ubuntu
10.04 were deployed to determine whether the type of platform will increase
the chance of a host been a favored target. The intention of deploying the two
operating systems was to see if a different OS makes a host more targeted than
the other. The honeypots that had Ubuntu as their base OS in VH1 are named
lajo, pani, roti and khana and in VH2 accounting, controller, management and
staff had Ubuntu as their base OS. The rest of the honeypots were using Centos
as their base OS. Based on the 70 days observation, systems that used Ubuntu
as their base OS have seen slightly higher number of unique source IP ad-
dresses than their counterpart Centos based systems.
In VH1 the total unique source IP addresses that attacked honeypots that had
Ubuntu as their base OS are 1196 while those attacked Centos based honeypots
were 1169. In VH2 1210 unique source IP addresses were observed attacking
honeypots that were using Ubuntu OS while 1185 unique source IP addresses
were observed attacking honeypots Centos based honeypots. The total num-
ber of unique source IP addresses attacked each version of the OS in VH1 and
VH2 during this project duration is presented in figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.7: Unique Source IP addresses Attacked OS for VH1 and VH2
4.8 Previously Reported Malicious IP Addresses
As mentioned in section 3.5 a perl script was developed to retrieve informa-
tion about the source IP addresses that attacked the honeynets from external
sources. The two websites that are used for retrieving information about the
geographical location and previous malicious nature are mentioned in 3.5. The
information gathered about malicious IP addresses in ISC is collected from
volunteers to throughout the world in order to fight back the most malicious
abuser of Internet. Those IP addresses which are not found in the Dshield
database do not mean that they are not malicious by nature, but as contribu-
tors to the database are volunteers the chance of all malicious IP address been
reported is not gauranteed [70].
In this project a perl script was developed to check the source IP addresses that
attacked the honeynets against Dshield database. As of writting, out of the
total IP addresses that have attacked the honeynets deployed to address the
problem statement of the research in the seventy days of observation, 33 % of
IP addresses have been reported previously to Internet Storm center (ISC)[70]
for their malicious activities.
4.9 Attackers Operating Systems
The Honeywall gateway uses passive fingerprinting techniques to find out
the operating system of an attacking machine. This technique minimizes the
risk of alerting the attackers compared to active fingerprinting. The tool that
is incoparated in Honeywall gateway is an open-source fingerprinting tools
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known as p0f. During the seventy days of observation the most used operat-
ing system by the cyber adversaries attacked the honeynets was the family of
Microsoft Windows which accounted to 58 % out of the total OS, followed by
Linux family OS at 26 % and 16 % were not recognized. The lack of recogni-
tion of the 16 % attacking operating systems could be due to skilled hackers
configured the systems OS to trick p0f. Figure 4.8 depicts the results in per-
centile.
Figure 4.8: Attackers IP OS During Observation Period
4.10 Attackers Country of Origin
The attackers country of origin in this project were decided based on the coun-
try information about each source IP addresses collected from the Perl script
that checks the status of source IP address against Dshield database, the coun-
try information revealed by the Honeywall gateway and a Perl script that
was developed to check country of each source IP address observed attack-
ing the honeynets in the seventy days against http://www.geoiptool.com/.
All script used are attached as appendix.
Based on the results even in the total number of source IP addresses that at-
tacked the Honeynets throughout the project period time, IP addresses orig-
inated from US has excelled on top by contributing 29.01% out of the total
observed attacking the Honeynets. This was followed by source IP addresses
from China with 19.14% and the third ranked country with 10.49% source IP
addresses was the Netherlands.
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Figure 4.9: Source IP Adddresses Country of Origin in Percentage
depicts the percentile of source IP addresses per country of origin. The country
of origin are represented in two letter country code as of ISO (International
Organization for Standardization).
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Chapter 5
Analysis
The previous section has shown the results that were found from the seventy
days observation the number of attacks systems with attractive FQDN and
non-attractive FQDN received throughout the project life time.
The results showed the unique source IP observed per destination and the total
number of attacks each honeynet received on the due course of the observation
time, the number of unique source IP addresses attacked each service in both
honeynets, the number of connection attempts took place on the services, and
the total of unique source IP addresses attacked Centos and Ubuntu based
honeypots. The analysis of these results is presented in this section.
5.1 Attractive vs Non Attractive FQDN
As it has been illustrated in section 4.4 and depicted in figure 4.3,the total
unique source IP addresses that were observed attacking VH1 during the time
of this project were 2365 while those registered attacking VH2 were 2395. The
difference of unique source IP addresses between VH1 and VH2 were only 30
unique source IP addresses that is VH2 got 30 more unique source IP addresses
attackes. Taking into account the observation period length and the number
of honeypots deployed in this project, this difference appears to be not signifi-
cant.
Figure 5.1 depicts daily average of unique source IP addresses attacked VH1
and VH2 during the seventy days of observation in this project. On average
there were 4.22 daily unique source IP attacked systems with non-attractive
FQDN that are referred in this project as VH1 and there were 4.27 daily unique
source IP attacked systems with attractive FQDN that are referred as VH2. On
average there seems no significant difference between the unique source IP
addresses that attacked VH2 and VH1.
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Figure 5.1: Daily Average of Unique Source IP Addresses Observed Attacking
VH1 and VH2
5.2 Source IP per Destination Port
Section 5.2 has illustrated the total number of unique source IP addresses that
attacked each service in VH1 and VH2. Section 5.2 also showed the count
difference between VH1 and VH2 for each service. According to the results
found in this project, the most used ports to get illegitimate access were SSH
and HTTP. The other services that were monitored in this project had seen less
than 500 unique source IP addresses throughout the observation time on both
VH1 and VH2. VH2 has seen 2 more unique source IP addresses in HTTPS
attacks than that of VH1 and 1 more unique source IP address in FTP attacks
comparing to FTP attacks in VH1. This difference appears to be not a signifi-
cant difference due to the time length and the number of honeypots involved
in this project.
The number of unique source IP addresses that attacked MySQL and SMTP
were the same for both VH1 and VH2. The number of connection attempts
that took place on these services were also the same on average as shown in
4.6. Therefore, the analysis is going to emphasize on SSH and HTTP attacks
only.
61
Chapter 5. Analysis
5.2.1 SSH ATTACKS
SSH attack was mostly used throughout the observation period. 1508 unique
source IP addresses have attacked VH1 and 1521 unique source IP addresses
have attacked VH2. VH2 has seen 13 more unique source IP addresses than
VH1. This difference also appears to be not significant with the time length of
the project.On average daily the unique source IP addresses that attacked VH1
on due course of this project were 2.69 while 2.71 unique source IP addresses
attacked VH2, about 3 unique source IP addresses each day for each group.
On average there was equal unique source IP addresses attacking VH1 and
VH2 daily during this project period. This shows that regardless the FQDN
a networked computer system has, the chance of been attacked on average is
approximately the same.Figure 5.2 depicts the daily average of unique source
IP addresses attacked through SSH attack to compromise systems in VH1 and
VH2 during the seventy days of observation period.
Figure 5.2: Daily Average of Unique Source IP Addresses Attacked SSH VH1
and VH2
5.2.2 HTTP ATTACKS
The second most attacked port during this project was HTTP port via web ap-
plication vulnerability. As it was mentioned in section 5.2, the total number
of unique source IP addresses that attacked VH1 through HTTP attacks dur-
ing this observation period were 1016 and 1030 source IP addresses attacked
VH2. VH2 has got 14 more unique source IP addresses that attacked HTTP
than that of VH1. This makes on average daily there were 1.81 unique source
IP addresses attacked VH1 and 1.84 unique souerce IP addresses attacked VH2
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HTTP attacks. This difference appears to be not significant taking into consid-
eration the period of the observation.
Figure 5.3: Daily Average of Unique Source IP Addresses Attacked HTTP VH1
and VH2
Figure 5.3 depicts the daily average of unique source IP addresses that attacked
VH1 and VH2 during the seventy days of observation.
5.3 Number of Connection Attempts
The other comparison criteria to addresses the problem statement was to see
if the number of connections attempts by the source source IP addresses took
place to compromise VH1 and VH2 during the observation period. The aver-
age number of connection attempts against VH1 and VH2 during this project
life time was illustrated in section 4.6. On average daily there were 6 more SSH
login attempts to VH2 than VH1. This difference appears to be not sufficient
enough to conclude that attractiveness of FQDN makes a computer system to
be a preferred target by cyber intruders when it comes to SSH attack.
The daily average of connection attempts via web vulnerability on HTTP was
57 to 62 for VH1 and VH2 respectively during this project life time. On average
daily VH2 has seen 3 more HTTP connection attempts VH1. This difference
appears also to be not significant difference to conclude that attractiveness of
FQDN makes a networked computer system more targeted by cyber adver-
saries for HTTP attacks.
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5.4 Attacks per Operating System
The total unique source IP addresses that attacked honeynets based on OS was
presented in section 4.7. Those unique source IP addresses attacked honeypots
with Ubuntu as their base OS in VH1 were 1196 and those attacked Centos
based honeypots were 1169. On average daily there were daily 4.27 unique
source IP addresses attacked Ubuntu based honeypots and those unique source
IP addresses that attacked honeypots which used Centos OS were 4.18. The
difference between the the number of unique source IP addresses that attacks
Centos and Ubuntu Oses based honeypots in VH1 on average daily appears
to be not significant.
The total number of unique source IP addresses that attacked hosts with Ubuntu
operating system were 1210 and 1185 unique source IP addresses attacked
honeypots with Centos operating system in VH2 in the seventy days of obser-
vation. On average daily there were 4.32 unique source IP addresses that at-
tacked Ubuntu based honeypots and 4.23 unique source IP addresses attacked
Centos based honeypots in VH2 on due course of this project. The difference
between the the number of unique source IP addresses that attacks Centos and
Ubuntu Oses based honeypots in VH2 on average daily appears also to be not
significant.
5.5 Statistical Analysis
The above sections of the analysis have shown descriptively that the during
the seventy days of observation the attractiveness of FQDN of a networked
computer systems does not seem to make a computer to be a more prefer-
able target than computer systems with non-attractive FQDN significantly by
hackers. The no significant difference between the number of unique source
IP addresses attacked honeypots with attractive FQDN and the number of
unique source IP addresses attacked honeypots with non-attractive FQDN will
be analysed using statistical method. The statistical analysis also will be ap-
plied to verify the no significant difference between the average number of
attacks agianst SSH and HTTP as well.
Based on the number of unique source IP addresses that attacked each group
of honeynet for a continuous seventy days on daily bases, the average number
of unique source IP addresses calculated for 24 hours for the two groups that
consists eight honeypots each.
The standard deviation of the number of attacks for attractive FQDN and non-
attractive FQDN are assumed not equal. The research hypothesis is tested
using student t distribution. Since the sample size is large, n=70, the Central
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Limit Theorem guarantees that the difference between the mean number of
attacks that an attractive FQDN receive and the mean number of attacks that
non-attractive FQDN receive has approximately a normal distribution regard-
less of the nature of their respective population distribution.
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Hypothesis stating and Assumptions
• H0: µ1-µ2 = 0
• H1: µ1-µ2 6= 0
• The two groups are independent as the attacks in one group does not
affect the other and elements in the groups are not paired.
• Each observation day is independent.
• Attackers are random as they find the honeynets in their own way.
• Variances are known to be equal
• Significance level (α) is 0.05 .
In a statistical test, the significance difference between two groups is deter-
mined by the calculated p-value. P-value is a number which lies is between 0
and 1. If the computed p-value is closer to 1, this indicates there are no sig-
nificant difference between the two groups. If the p-value is closer to 0, this
implies that the means of the two groups of data are significantly different [75].
A two sided independent t-test was conducted using R statistical software.
µ1represents the mean for attractive FQDN and µ2 represents the mean for
non-attractive FQDN. The results and its interpretation is presented below.
5.5.1 Attractive vs Non Attractive FQDN
Based on the daily average of unique source IP addresses that attacked at-
tractive FQDN and non-attractive FQDN via all the services that were open
and running throughout the project period time. Table 5.1shows the sample
statistics: Sample sizes for Attractive FQDN and for Non-Attractive FQDN,
the daily mean of unique source IP addresses attacked VH2 and VH1, sam-
ple standard deviation and standard error mean for VH2 and VH1 respec-
tively.
Attractive FQDN Non Attractive FQDN
Sample Size n1 = 70 n2 = 70
Sample Mean x¯1= 4.279286 x¯2 = 4.225571
Sample Standard deviation 0.5383343 0.671748
Sample Standard Error Mean 0.06434326 0.08028924
Table 5.1: Computed t-test Values for VH2 and VH1
The computed p-value is 0.6025 which is greater than the level of significance
α= 0.05 that was chosen for this project. There is sufficient sample evidence
to support the claim that, on average, there is no significant difference be-
tween the number of attacks that computers with attractive FQDN receive and
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the average number of attacks that computers with non-attractive FQDN re-
ceive.
5.5.2 SSH ATTACKS
The computed values of the number of unique source IP adddresses that at-
tacked attractive FQDN and non-attractive FQDN via SSH attack in the sev-
enty days of observation are presented in 5.2.
Table 5.2 shows daily mean of unique source IP addresses attacked SSH at VH2
and VH1 respectively, sample standard deviation and standard error mean for
VH2 and VH1 respectively.
Attractive FQDN Non Attractive FQDN
Sample Size n1 = 70 n2 = 70
Sample Mean x¯1 = 2.716714 x¯2 = 2.695143
Sample Standard deviation 0.2742459 0.2828465
Sample Standard Error Mean 0.03277865 0. 0.03380663
Table 5.2: Computed T-Test Values for SSH Attacks at VH2 and VH1
The computed p-value for SSH attacks for attractive FQDN and on-attractive
FQDN is 0.6476 which greater than the significance level choosen on this project.
This confirms that the claim, on average, there is no significant difference be-
tween the number of SSH attacks that computers with attractive FQDN receive
and the average number of attacks that computers with non-attractive FQDN
receive.
5.5.3 HTTP ATTACKS
The second most used port to compromise the honeypots by the adversaries
in this project was HTTP at port 80 via web application vulnerability. The
computed values of the number of unique source IP addresses that attacked
HTTP service at VH2 and VH1 are presented in 5.3.
Attractive FQDN Non Attractive FQDN
Sample Size n1 = 70 n2 = 70
Sample Mean x¯1 = 1.842143 x¯2 = 1.816714
Sample Standard deviation 0.156695 0.1230968
Sample Standard Error Mean 0.01872863 0.01471288
Table 5.3: Computed T-Test Values for HTTP Attacks at VH2 and VH1
The computed p-value for HTTP attacks for attractice FQDN and non-attractive
FQDN is 0.2876 which is also greater than the significance level choosen for
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this project that is 0.05. There is sufficient sample evidence to support the
claim that, on average, there is no significant difference between the number
of HTTP attacks that computers with attractive FQDN receive and the average
number of attacks that computers with non-attractive FQDN receive.
5.5.4 Comparing within Groups
To analyze the equality of the mean within each group, that is within the attrac-
tive FQDN and within non Attractive FQDN an analysis of variance, ANOVA
specifically a single factor ANOVA was performed in Microsoft Excel. The
analysis is conducted to verify if there is a significant difference between the
number of attacks the received within the same group.
Anova: Single Factor
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Accounting 70 301 4,30 4,65
Controller 70 304 4,34 3,76
Investment 70 292 4,17 2,84
Hr 70 299 4,27 3,48
Management 70 303 4,33 2,63
Payroll 70 299 4,27 2,93
Finance 70 295 4,21 3,36
Staff 70 302 4,31 2,22
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 1,683929 7 0,240561 0,074416 0,999358 2,026155
Within Groups 1784,414 552 3,232635
Total 1786,098 559
Table 5.4: ANOVA Sigle Factor Test For VH2
The list of name under column Groups are hostnames for the attractive FQDN.
As it can be seen from 5.4 comparison of mean number of attacks received
by each honeypot with attractive FQDN via ANOVA test also demonstrated
that there is no significant difference (F=0.0744, p=0.9993). On the summary
section the averages and variances results have been rounded for clarity of
purposes. The lists under column Groups on 5.5 are hostnames under the
domain vlab.cs.hioa.no for the non-attractive FQDN. A comparison of mean
number of attacks received by each honeypot within the non-attractive FQDN
via ANOVA test also demonstrated that there is no significant difference (F=0.0655,
p=0.9995). On the summary section the averages and variances results have
been rounded for clarity of purposes.
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Anova: Single Factor
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
serb9 70 290 4,14 3,20
vm10 70 291 4,16 3,24
lajo 70 301 4,30 3,20
najka 70 293 4,19 3,83
lao 70 295 4,21 4,37
pani 70 297 4,24 3,23
roti 70 300 4,29 3,69
khana 70 298 4,26 4,11
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 1,65535714 7 0,236479592 0,065548823 0,99957796 2,026154933
Within Groups 1991,44286 552 3,607686335
Total 1993,09821 559
Table 5.5: ANOVA Sigle Factor Test For VH1
Anova Test For SSH ATTACKS
The Anova test for the equality of mean number of SSH attacks each honeypot
received within VH1 and VH2 has also demonstrated that there is no signifi-
cant difference between the number of SSH attacks received by each honeypot
at VH1 (F=0,161439; p=0,992367) and (F=0,045855; p=0,999872) for VH2. The
calculated Anova test using Microsoft Excel for VH1 and VH2 for SSH attacks
are attached on the appendix section of the document.
Anova Test For HTTP ATTACKS
The equality of the mean within each group using Anova single test for HTTP
attacks has also demonstrated that there is no significant difference between
the number of attacks received by each honeypot at VH1 (F=0,123284, p=0,996708)
and (F=0, 104505, p=0,998058) at VH2. The calculated Anova test using Mi-
crosoft Excel for VH1 and VH2 are attached on the appendix section of the
document.
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5.6 Attackers Profile
5.6.1 Malicious IP Addresses
Section 4.8 has mentioned the result retrieved from www.dshield.org database
about previous status of the IP addresses that have attacked the honeynets dur-
ing the observation period. Out of the total IP addresses that have attacked the
honeynets in the seventy observation days, 33 % of them have been reported
as been malicious. Out of the 33 % previously reported, IP addresses that
orginated from US are ranked first by contributing 10.71 % followed by IP ad-
dresses from China with 8,04 %. Figure 5.4 depicts the percentile each country
contributed to the 33% that was explained in section 4.8.
Figure 5.4: Reported Malicious IP Addresses per Country in Percentage
The top ten IP addresses that have made the highest number of attempts in the
honeynets on SSH and HTTP and that have been reported to be malicious ac-
cording to information retrieved on Dshield are presented in 5.6and 5.7 respec-
tively. The source IP address with the highest number of connection attempts
is listed on top of the tables for both services.
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IP Address Hostname Country Reports Target Port
219.149.138.230 219.149.138.230 CN 3966 22
82.221.105.6 82.221.105.6 IS 151243 22
5.79.78.230 hosted-by-kingrdp.com NL 16332 22
198.20.69.98 singlehop1.shodanhq.com US 289090 22
209.126.230.71 internetsurvey-2.erratasec.com US 473720 22
221.230.54.115 221.230.54.115 CN 42070 22
46.218.179.49 reverse.completel.fr FR 117713 22
61.160.251.136 61.160.251.136 CN 30871 22
212.116.159.146 212.116.159.146 BG 31296 22
211.95.76.242 211.95.76.242 CN 21605 22
Table 5.6: Top 10 IP Address Attacked SSH During Project Period and Their
Status in Dshield
IP Address Hostname Country Reports Target Port
189.38.56.67 renacor02.dominiotemporarioidc.com BR 12410 80
113.57.188.106 arpa.hb.cnc.cn CN 21042 80
183.60.48.25 183.60.48.25 CN 52822 80
92.240.68.152 92.240.68.152 LV 79577 80
92.240.68.153 92.240.68.153 LV 80799 80
198.20.69.74 singlehop2.shodanhq.com US 639407 80
198.20.70.114 singlehop3.shodanhq.com US 436358 80
94.102.49.211 94.102.49.211 NL 498662 80
192.151.144.234 192.151.144.234 US 346286 80
66.7.220.78 dimer.hostdimer.com US 6184 80
Table 5.7: Top 10 IP Address Attacked HTTP During Project Period and Their
Status in Dshield
5.6.2 Country of Origin
Section 4.10 has shown the country of origin of the source IP addresses that
have attacked the honeynets and the percentage each country contributed to
the total. The country of origin of a source IP address was issued in this docu-
ment based on the information retrieved from the three source that were men-
tioned in section 4.10. In the seventy days of observation period, some of the
IP addresses that attacked the honeynets belong to the same domain name or
network address. The top five domains that have participated in attacking the
honeynets with the highest number of IP addresses are presented 5.8 along-
side the country of origin of the IP address. As some of the network addresses
had no domain names while retrieving information about the attackers from
the three databases on the due course of the project. For those network ad-
dresses with no domain names, a blank space is left under the Domain Name
field of the table.
Domain names orginated from US has contributed the highest number of source
IP addresses from the same network addresses (domain name). The US based
amazon instances have made a total of ten IP addresses from the domain name
compute-1.amazonaws.com. Based on the analysis in the Honeywall gateway
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Network Address Domain Name Country Source IP
Addresses Count
200.165.0.0/17
(200.165.0.0-
200.165.127.255)
medquimica.com.br BR 3
113.56.0.0/15
(113.56.0.0-
113.57.255.255)
arpa.hb.cnc.cn CN 3
92.240.64.0/19
(92.240.64.0-
92.240.95.255)
LV 2
198.20.64.0/18
(198.20.64.0-
198.20.127.255)
shodanhq.com US 6
54.221.0.0/16
(54.221.0.0-
54.221.255.255)
compute-1.amazonaws.com US 10
Table 5.8: Top 5 Networks with Highest Number of Hosts Attacked Honeynets
log files about network traffic to the honeynets, four of the IP addresses from
shodanhq.com had attacked the sixteen honeypots via TCP SYN flooding at-
tack. This domain is also USA based.
TCP SYN Flooding attack is one of the widely used denial-of-attack tactics to
compromise network systems [37]. TCP SYN Flooding attack manipulates the
three-way handshake of TCP connection mechanisms, but does not send the
ACK packet after receiving the SYN+ACK packet from the listener for its first
packet which is SYN. The three-way handshake in TCP connection establish-
ment has been explained on the section (Network Scan) and is also illustrated
by figure on the same section. The attackers flooded the target machine with
SYN packets directing at HTTP port in order to cause denial-of-service [36].
The aim of this attack is not overloading network resources or memory of the
host, but exhausting the backlog of the server which is associated with the
port number due to full of bogus half-open connection in order to which re-
sults the rejection of legitimate SYN segments. This attack is often carried out
by spoofed IP addresses which will not verify the SYN+ACK from the listener
for the initial SYN packet it has received [41].
The remain two IP addresses from shodanhq.com domain have involved in
brute force attack on SSH. One of the two which attacked the honeynets via
brute force attack with the hostname singlehop2.shodanhq.com and IP address
198.20.69.98 is one of the most attempted IP addresses that tried to compro-
mise the honeynets with username and password login attempts via port 22
(SSH service). Brute-force attack is another common attack method that tries
to break a network system by trial and error mechanism. Nowadays such at-
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tacks are performed by automating a consecutive guesses to find a pair of user
name and password combination in order to get access to network systems
[37].
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Chapter 6
Discussion
The previous section has analysed the results that were found from this setup
to address the problem statement. This chapter will evaluate the project pro-
cess in general and observations that during the process. It also highlights
future work.
6.1 Setup Tradeoffs
The setup enabled to collect data that are essential to answer the problem state-
ment of the research questions. The data collected included unique source IP,
initial and final timestamp, destination port, and the number of connection at-
tempts a particular source IP addresses made to a specific destination IP on the
services that were open and running within it. This data collection was done
every mid-night for a continuous seventy days on sixteen honeypots which
made two honeynets. Each honeynet had eight honeypots that were hosted
in one physical server. Eight of the honeypots were give an attractive FQDN
while the other eight were given non-attractive FQDN. The honeynets were
launched at the same time and where running for a continuous seventy days.
This research was performed in a local network at HiOA network in a con-
trolled setup. The honeynets were controlled through the Honeywall gate-
way which was able to monitor every traffic movement from and to the hon-
eynets that were assigned attractive FQDN and non-attractive FQDN. The IP
addresses that were allocated to carry out the research were from the same sub-
net from the IP pools of HiOA network and they were a sequential IP numbers.
This might have an impact that the number of unique source IP addresses at-
tacked both honeynets indeed be largely the same. If it was possible to run
some honeypots in a different subnet under the same domain, it would have
enhanced the data collection and analysis to develop a wider knowledge out
of the project while running it still under controlled environment. However,
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this was not done as there was only one subnet allowed to be used on this
project by HiOA due to the risks that honeypot projects involve.
As depicted in 4.4 out of the total number of unique source IP addresses
which attacked the services that were open and running on due course of this
project, the 77% had attacked both honeynets. Though this might seem as
a deficiency for not getting a wider view about global image by setting up a
number honeynets in different geographical location via cloud computing, but
it also gives the opportunity to have a full control over the observation envi-
ronment as data collection needs to be precise. As stated in [71] inaccuracy in
data collection will lead to unreliable and biased decision. The other reason
for setting up a local honeynets were to avoid the number of attack counts that
could generate due to targeted attacks that could be due to some political or
other non-constant phenomena that could lead to cyber-attacks. The continu-
ous cyber-attacks that targeted Australian web site in the months of October
and November of 2013 by a hacking group called Anonymous Indonesia [8]
is a good example of non-constant cyber-attack phenomena. Data collected in
such incidence could not be reliable to make a general decision for the events
that take place in the Internet. Therefore, to address the problem statement of
this research setting up local honeynet with the same setup configuration was
the preferred option.
The other option that might had increase the number of attacks the honeypots
could receive was to deploy them under the second top level domain which is
hioa.no. The subdomain the honeypots deployed was vlab.cs.hioa.no which is
pretty obvious to cyber adversaries that the hosts are dedicated for educational
domain for computer labs. This might also play a role on the decreasing the at-
tractiveness of the host or if there really are hackers looking after an attractive
FQDN, these hosts will not be much attractive that they could be if they were
hosted under hioa.no The other option that might had increase the number of
attacks the honeypots could receive was to deploy them under the second top
level domain which is hioa.no. The subdomain the honeypots deployed was
vlab.cs.hioa.no which is pretty obvious to cyber adversaries that the hosts are
dedicated for educational domain for computer labs. This might also play a
role on the decreasing the attractiveness of the host. If there really are hackers
looking after an attractive FQDN, these hosts will not be much attractive that
they could be if they were hosted under hioa.no. If it was possible to acquire
more attractive domain names such as for financial institutions domain like
bank.no, the attractiveness of the FQDN might had an impact. However, this
was not possible on this project so the research was only able to be carried out
in what was available.
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6.2 Prior Experiment
Before the launch of the honeynets to address the problem statement, there
was a trial experiment conducted using four public IP addresses. The two IP
addresses were assigned FQDN and the two were bare IP addresses without
domain names. The purpose of the trial was the same as the research ques-
tions, but the two IP addresses were not given any domain name and the ob-
servation were only done to SSH and HTTP attacks. The trial experiment was
performed for seven days. Based on the seven days trial experiment results,
a brief analysis on the number of attacks were performed. Though, this ex-
periment cannot be used to make a conclusive decision but mentioning the
findings is worth. The results and brief analysis of this trial experiment also
showed that on average the number of attacks IP addresses with FQDN got
was not significantly different than those IP without domain names got via
SSH and HTTP attacks. The IP addresses that were used for the trial experi-
ment were not used to perform the research work.
6.3 Sebek Client
One of the main objectives behind the design of honeypots was to learn about
the hackers activities after they are successfully compromise the system [4].
This could have been achieved by installing a kernel level keylogger on the
honeypot. The Honeywall project have developed a data capture tool known
as Sebek. This data capture tool has a client and server side. The server side of
Sebek is incorporated with the Honeywall CDROM Roo but the client side of
it is installed in the honeypots. Sebek client is intended to capture all attackers
activity such keystrokes, uploaded files and send them to Sebek server using
a dedicated UDP port.
This type of keylogger could minimize the risk of alerting experienced hack-
ers from realizing that they are being deceived. Though securely copying hon-
eypot log files to a remote server could have been implemented to track the
activity of the hackers after successful attack, but this is not a guaranteed so-
lution specially when dealing with professional hackers as they can announce
the existence of the honeynet which will reduce the value of the honeynet. If
the honeynet is identified, attackers might ignore it or launch high-level at-
tacks against the network that might interrupt the data collection process to
address the problem statement or fill bogus data which could lead to a wrong
conclusion [77].
In this project the installation of Sebek client was attempted in the current and
older versions of Linux family as well in Windows OS. However, the attempts
was not successful. On the due course of the project life time, the Sebek client
version for both Linux and Windows OS is outdated and no further work has
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been done to make the client side of data capture tool made by the Honey-
wall project for over five years. Some of the related previous research papers
[11, 60] that were reviewed on due course of the project had also stated that
the attempt made to install Sebek client was not successful, though those pa-
pers stated that they only tried to install it on latest and one version of Linux
OS.
6.4 Compromised Systems
During the project life time there were in a total eleven honeypots compro-
mised through SSH brute force attacks. As a compromised systems could be
used by cyber adversaries as attacking tool to legitimate systems on the In-
ternet, any compromised honeypot in this project was closely followed but
allowed to run for few days before taking it down. This was done to avoid
any suspicion by successful attacker that there is a honeynet in the given net-
work. The other reason for letting the compromised honeypots running for a
limited period of time was to see if there is any trace of the attackers on the
system that can be analysed to learn about the activities of the hackers. How-
ever, there were no much interesting traces that were retrieved after analysing
the compromised honeypots to be reported except the most commonly used
Linux commands like ”ls”, ”w” etc. that have been constantly reported on sev-
eral related previous research papers that have been reviewed on due course
of this project. Therefore, the author decided just for demonstration purpose
only to present about two of the successful break-in in via SSH brute force .
The first honeypot that was compromised on this project was after three days
of the honeynets been launched. The successful attack was carried out via
remote login through SSH on Sept 23 at 13:05:39 from a source IP address
94.102.63.245 and source port 63312. The source IP is originated from Nether-
lands. The username and password used to break-in the honeypot was ”guest”
and guest. Most of the weak username and password combination that was
used in this project were retrieved from previous honeypot projects [60, 78]
that were conducted in the same premises as this project was performed.
Figure 6.1: Successful Login Attempt via SSH at lajo
The second honeypot that was compromised via SSH brute force attack was
a honeypot with non-attractive FQDN. The IP address that compromised the
honeypot was 83.229.69.36 and source port 44796 and the attacker had succeed
after several attempts for a period of one month since the launch of the hon-
eynets. The successful login was on 21st Oct 2013 at 20:04:17 via username
”guest” and password ”Guest1”. This addition of capital and a single digit
took the hackers one month to successfully break-in to the system.
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Figure 6.2: Successful Login Attempt via SSH
6.5 Port Zero
One of the observation from the network traffic to and from the honeypots
which was logged by the Honeywall gateway was the netwrok traffic to port
zero. In the seventy days period of this project is the heavy incoming network
traffic to port zero via TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols were observed. Though
the three protocols have been used by the adversaries to connect to port zero
but TCP connection attempts dominated most. According to Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA), port 0 is reserved meaning that there should no
any service running on it. Cyber adversaries can use such traffic to fingerprint
victims OS as different Oses could reply to port zero traffic differently. How-
ever, the heavy incoming network traffic to port 0 can be sign of a possible
reconnaissance attack. The network traffic to port zero during this project pe-
riod have excelled all the services that were monitored except network traffic
to SSH and HTTP services. Figure 6.3 illustrates the network traffic to port zero
via TCP and ICMP protocols at a particular destination IP from three different
source IP addresses that took place on November 28.
Figure 6.3: Snapshot Network Traffic to Port Zero
6.6 Future Work
This research was carried out in a local network controlled setup. The domain
name that the honeypots shared was vlab.cs.hioa.no which was an educational
institute domain. The research has shown the number of attackers and severity
of conncetion attempts that hosts with attractive FQDN gets are approximetly
the same with host with non-attractive FQDN under the same domain. How-
ever, in order to verify whether an attractive FQDN will make a host more
targeted by cyber adversaries or not needs to investigated. Therefore, some
potential research areas emerged from this project are listed below.
• On this project most of the attackers were observed attacking the six-
teen honeypots. Investigating if this scenario applies to other subnets as
well could help in clarify if the attacks are the targeting a specific subnet
78
Chapter 6. Discussion
under the same domain as the subnet could represent different adminis-
trative group within an organization.
• Set up the same testing environment with the same configuration under
different domains. For example in financial institution domains.
• A trial experiment of the number of attacks IP addresses with no do-
main name and IP addresses with domain name received via SSH and
HTTP attacks was conduct prior to the experiment, but the experiment
duration was not reasonable enough to make a conclusion. Therefore,
expanding the experiment period could enable to figure out if there is a
difference in the number and severity of attacks due to domain name.
• The Honeywall project has made a remarkable work in building the
Honeywall CDROM ROO which incorporates server side data capture
tool or Sebek server. However, the client side of Sebek is not compatible
with current OS versions. Making Sebek client working with current OS
will give security professional and network adminstrator more informa-
tion about hackers motivation, tactics and activities.
• During the period of this project a noticable heavy traffic to port zero has
been observed via TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols. Recently the network
traffic at port zero has created attention to network security professionals
also. Therefore, conducting a research on this will enhance the security
measure needed to be taken.
• Identify malicious IP addresses at local network and create automated
reporting mechanism to ISC in order to create a public awareness about
the IP addresses that are malicious in nature.
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Conclusion
The problem statement of this research work was to address if servers with at-
tractive FQDN will be more targeted than servers with non-attractive FQDN.
To address the problem statement, a controlled local virtual honeynet was set
up. The two groups of honeynet had each eight honeypots with public IP
addresses. The eight honeypots within group virtual honeynet 1 (VH1) were
assigned non-attractive FQDN while the other eight honeypots under virtual
honeynet 2 (VH2) were assigned attractive FQDN. These two groups of hon-
eynet were online for consecutive seventy days. There were six services that
were open and running on the due course of this project. The services that
were monitored under this project were SSH, HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, MySQL and
SMTP in both honeynets and the results and statistical analysis presented in 4
and 5 shows that the attack frequency is not affected by the attractive FQDNs.
Thus, validating the null hypothesis there is no difference between the aver-
age number of attacks that servers with attractive domain names receive and
the average number of attacks that servers with non-attractive domain names
receive.
Following are the summarized answers to the questions defined in section
1.2.
1. The finding shows that the attractiveness of fully qualified domain name
does not create a significant difference on average in the number of unique
source IP addresses attacked the honeynet with attractive FQDN than
that of the average number of unique source IP addresses attacked the
honeynet with non-attractive FQDN. In this regard the attractiveness of
the FQDN have not made the servers more targeted than attackers were
not targeting the honeypots based on their names.
Analysis on service level was also conducted on the two most attacked
services in this project which were SSH and HTTP. The analysis con-
ducted on attacks per service level have also not shown a significant dif-
ference between the average number of attacks received by the services
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at honeynet with attractive FQDN and the average number of attacks re-
ceived by the services under honeynet with non-attractive FQDN. The
other analysis conduct was to find out if there was a significant differ-
ence between the number of attacks received within the same group of
honeynet that is the attractive and non-attractive FQDN through Anova
single factor test. This result also shows that there is no significant dif-
ference between the number of attacks each honeypot received.
All the analysis conducted in this regard shows that the attacks were
not targeting for the attractive FQDN rather randomly attacking for any
vulnerable system.
2. In each honeynet there were four honeypots that had Centos as a base
OS and the other four honeypots had Ubuntu as a base OS. On average,
the number of attacks received by Centos based honeypots and Ubuntu
based honeypots were not significantly different. This finding applies
for honeynet with attractive and non-attractive FQDN.
3. In both groups SSH services were the most targeted service by the at-
tackers followed by HTTP services. The third most probed service dur-
ing the observation period was FTP then followed by HTTPS. Probes
against MySQL and SMTP were ranked fifth and sixth respectively. This
applies for both honeynets. On average the daily probe magnitude be-
tween the similar services, for example SSH servervice in non-attractive
(VH1) and SSH in attractive (VH2) FQDN, between the two groups of
honeynets were not significantly different.
The high number of SSH brute force attack attempts by the adversaries
through weak username and password combination indicates that though
news about cyber-attacks have raised than they use to be, but still there
is ignorance in choosing a strong username and password combination
by network system users. Therefore, enforcing a strong username and
password combination rule is inevitable.
4. Dshield.org database was used to address this question. Based on the
information retrieved, some of source IP addresses that have attacked
the honeynet have been observed attacking other networks. Out of all
the source IP addresses attacked both honeynets, 33 % of them have
been observed attacking other networks. However, the majority or 67
% of the source IP addresses attacked the honeynets in this project was
not found in the Dshield database. Although these source IP addresses
are not found in Dshield database, it does not mean they can be elimi-
nated from a potential threats to the whole Internet as the information
in Dshield database is collected from volunteers meaning that not all
malicious IP addresses are reported. Therefore, enhancing the Dshield
database or creating a general public awareness about malicious IP ad-
dresses can help in minimizing the threats that the Internet faces today.
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Based on the information retrieved about attacker’s country of origin
most of the attacks source were originated from USA. In all the analysis
that were conducted about the source IP address information related to
the country of origin, USA based source IP addresses have dominated
the numbers. However, the author is not blaming any country or the
owners of domain names (IP addresses) that are mentioned in this docu-
ment as been actively engaged in malicious activities because the source
IP addresses might be victims themselves which are operating under
command and control (C & C) or botnets.
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Appendix A. SSH Log Analyzer
.1 AppendixA
This perl script is designed to analyse SSH log files.
Listing 1: SSH Log Analyzer
1
2 #!/ usr/bin/p e r l
3
4 # This p e r l s c r i p t i s designed to analyse SSH log
5 # f i l e s of f a i l e d attempts . I t c a l c u l a t e s s t a t i s t i c
6 # of event within the log f i l e and converts time to l o c a l .
7 # This s c r i p t was o r i g i n a l l y developed by Evangelos Tasoulas
8 # and Modified by the author of the document to f i t f o r the p r o j e c t
9 # needs .
10
11 # Needed packages
12 use Getopt : : Std ;
13 use s t r i c t ” vars ” ;
14 use Time : : Local ;
15 use S t a t i s t i c s : : D e s c r i p t i v e ;
16
17
18
19 # Global v a r i a b l e s
20 my $VERBOSE = 0 ;
21 my $DEBUG = 0 ;
22 my $OVER2Lines = 0 ;
23
24 #####################
25 # handle f l a g s and arguments
26 # Example : c == ”−c ” , c : == ”−c argument”
27 my $ o p t s t r i n g = ’ hvdf : a ’ ;
28 getopts ( ” $ o p t s t r i n g ” , \my %opt ) or usage ( ) and e x i t 1 ;
29
30 # p r i n t help message i f −h i s invoked
31 i f ( $opt { ’h ’} ){
32 usage ( ) ;
33 e x i t 0 ;
34 }
35
36 $VERBOSE = 1 i f $opt { ’v ’ } ;
37 $DEBUG = 1 i f $opt { ’d ’ } ;
38 $OVER2Lines = 1 i f $opt { ’ a ’ } ;
39
40 # main program content
41 my $FILENAME = $opt { ’ f ’ } ;
42 # I f no f i l e has been supplied , use the
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43 # one from the d e f a u l t path .
44 i f ($FILENAME eq ””) {
45 $FILENAME = ” falmawit . log ” ;
46 }
47 my %SCANS;
48 my %c o n n e c t i o n s p e r s e c ;
49
50
51 verbose (” Filename i s $FILENAME\n ” ) ;
52
53 die ” Error : No such f i l e : $FILENAME\n” \
54 unless −f $FILENAME ;
55 #Open f i l e to analyse
56 open ( FILE , ”$FILENAME”) or die \
57 ”Unable to open a f i l e : $ !\n ” ;
58
59 #Loop through f i l e
60 while (my $ l i n e = <FILE>) {
61 i f ( $ l i n e =˜ / ˆ (\ S{3} \d\d \d\d :\d\d :\d\d ) (\ S {1 ,} )\
62 . * a u t h e n t i c a t i o n f a i l u r e . * rhos t =(\S [ ˆ ] * ) / ) {
63
64 my $remotehost = $3 ;
65 my $ t a r g e t = $2 ;
66
67 ( getUnix ( $1 ) − getUnix ($SCANS{$remotehost}
68 {” stop date ”} ) ) . ”\n”
69 i f getUnix ($SCANS{$remotehost} \
70 {” stop date ” } ) ;
71 push ( @connect ions per sec , \
72 ( ( getUnix ( $1 ) − getUnix ($SCANS{$remotehost} \
73 {” stop date ” } ) ) ) ) i f getUnix ($SCANS{$remotehost }\
74 {” stop date ” } ) ;
75 debug (” P r i n t i n g Conns Per Sec \
76 (” . @connect ions per sec . ” ) \n ” ) ;
77 push @{ $ c o n n e c t i o n s p e r s e c {$remotehost} } ,\
78 ( ( getUnix ( $1 ) − getUnix ($SCANS{$remotehost }\
79 {” stop date ” } ) ) )
80 i f getUnix ($SCANS{$remotehost }{” stop date ” } ) ;
81 $SCANS{$remotehost }{” c o n n e c t i o n s p e r s e c ”} \
82 { ( ( getUnix ( $1 ) − getUnix ($SCANS{$remotehost} \
83 {” stop date ”} ) ) )}+ + ;
84 $SCANS{$remotehost }{” count ”}++;
85 $SCANS{$remotehost }{” t a r g e t ”}{ $ t a r g e t } = 1 ;
86 $SCANS{$remotehost }{” s t a r t date ”} = $1 \
87 unless $SCANS{$remotehost }{” s t a r t date ”} ;
88 $SCANS{$remotehost }{” stop date ”} = $1 ;
89 }
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90 }
91
92
93 i f ( $OVER2Lines ) {
94 p r i n t ”Only remote hosts with more than 2 \
95 connect ion attempts w i l l be pr inted out !\n\n ” ;
96 p r i n t r e s u l t s ( 2 ) ;
97 }
98 e l s e {
99 p r i n t r e s u l t s ( 0 ) ;
100 }
101
102
103 #####################
104 # Helper r o u t i n e s
105
106 sub usage {
107 # p r i n t s the c o r r e c t use of t h i s s c r i p t
108 p r i n t ”Usage : \n ” ;
109 p r i n t ”−h Usage\n ” ;
110 p r i n t ”−v Verbose\n ” ;
111 p r i n t ”−d Debug\n ” ;
112 p r i n t ”− f Choose log f i l e to read\n ” ;
113 p r i n t ”−a P r i n t only hosts with more than 2 \
114 connect ion attempts \n ” ;
115 }
116
117 sub verbose {
118 p r i n t $ [ 0 ] i f ( $VERBOSE ) ;
119 }
120
121 sub debug {
122 p r i n t $ [ 0 ] i f ( $DEBUG ) ;
123 }
124
125 my %MONTHS = (
126 ” Jan ” => 0 ,
127 ”Feb” => 1 ,
128 ”Mar” => 2 ,
129 ”Apr” => 3 ,
130 ”May” => 4 ,
131 ”Jun” => 5 ,
132 ” J u l ” => 6 ,
133 ”Aug” => 7 ,
134 ”Sep” => 8 ,
135 ”Oct” => 9 ,
136 ”Nov” => 10 ,
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137 ”Dec” => 11
138 ) ;
139
140 sub getUnix {
141 my $date = $ [ 0 ] ;
142
143 i f ( $date =˜ /ˆ (\w{3} ) (\d\d ) (\d\d ) : ( \ d\d ) : ( \ d\d ) / ) {
144 my $month = $1 ;
145 my $day = $2 ;
146 my $hour = $3 ;
147 my $minute = $4 ;
148 my $second = $5 ;
149 my $year ;
150
151 # Avoid hard coding of the year . Determine i t automat i ca l ly .
152 (my $CurrentSecond ,
153 my $CurrentMinute ,
154 my $CurrentHour ,
155 my $CurrentDay ,
156 my $CurrentMonth ,
157 my $CurrentYear ,
158 my $CurrentWeekDay ,
159 my $CurrentDayOfYear ,
160 my $CurrentIsDST ) = l o c a l t i m e ( time ) ;
161
162 $CurrentYear += 1900 ;
163 $CurrentMonth ++;
164 #my $CurrentDate = ”$CurrentDay/$CurrentMonth/$CurrentYear ” ;
165 # p r i n t $CurrentDate ;
166 i f ($MONTHS{$month} = 11 && $CurrentMonth = 0) {
167 $year = $CurrentYear − 1 ;
168 }
169 e l s e {
170 $year = $CurrentYear ;
171 }
172 return t i m e l o c a l ( $second , $minute , $hour , \
173 $day , $MONTHS{$month} , $year ) ;
174 }
175 }
176
177 sub p r i n t r e s u l t s {
178
179 my $attempts = 0 ;
180 my $ s t a r t d a t e = 0 ;
181 my $stop date = 0 ;
182 my $scan length = 0 ;
183 my $tBTNattempts = 0 ;
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184 my $DstIP ;
185 my $number of minumum attempts = $ [ 0 ] ;
186 my $ t o t a l a t t e m p t s = 0 ;
187
188 p r i n t ” SourceIP \n ” ;
189
190 p r i n t ” SourceIP \ t DestIP \ t NumAttempts \ t \
191 Star tDate \ t EndDate \ t ScanLength/sec \ t \
192 TimeBTN Attempts \n ” ;
193 foreach my $remotehost ( keys %SCANS) \
194 {
195 i f ($SCANS{$remotehost }{” count ”} > \
196 $number of minumum attempts ) {
197
198 my @data di f fe rence between connec t ions in seconds = \
199 @{ $ c o n n e c t i o n s p e r s e c {$remotehost} } ;
200 # Some extreme values between the scans can
201 # change the mean value dramat ica l ly ,
202 # so use the s t a t i s t i c s l i b r a r y to improve our r e s u l t s .
203 my $numberOfDifferenceBetweenConnections =
204 s c a l a r \
205 ( @data di f fe rence between connec t ions in seconds ) ;
206
207 # i f we had only one connect ion then there i s
208 # no d i f f e r e n c e between the attempts as there
209 # i s only one attempt .
210 # That means t h a t $numberOfDifferenceBetweenConnections
211 # equals to 0 ;
212 # i f we had only two connect ions , then then j u s t
213 # p r i n t the time d i f f e r e n c e between them .
214 # $numberOfDifferenceBetweenConnections equals to
215 # 1 in t h i s case .
216 # In any other case check the median and the mean
217 # value of the t o t a l values .
218 # I f the d i f f e r e n c e i s l e s s than 2 , p r i n t the mean
219 # value otherwise p r i n t the median value .
220 i f ( $numberOfDifferenceBetweenConnections == 0) {
221 ## p r i n t ”Time between connect ion attempts : 0\n ” ;
222 }
223 e l s i f ( $numberOfDifferenceBetweenConnections == 1) {
224 ## p r i n t ”Time between connect ion attempts : \
225 ” . @data di f fe rence between connec t ions in seconds [ 0 ] \
226 . ”\n ” ;
227 }
228 e l s e {
229 my $ s t a t = S t a t i s t i c s : : D e s c r i p t i v e : : Ful l−>new ( ) ;
230
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231 $ s t a t−>add data \
232 ( @data di f fe rence between connec t ions in seconds ) ;
233
234 my $median = $ s t a t−>median ;
235 my $mean = $ s t a t−>mean ;
236 debug (” Median : ” . $median . ”\n ” ) ;
237 debug (”Mean : ” . $mean . ”\n\n ” ) ;
238 i f ( abs ( $mean−$median ) > 2) {
239 p r i n t ”Time between connect ion attempts : \
240 ” . $median . ”\n ” ;
241 }
242 e l s e {
243 p r i n t ”Time between connect ion attempts : ” \
244 . $mean . ”\n ” ;
245 $tBTNattempts = $mean ;
246 }
247 }
248
249 p r i n t ”Remote scan from : ‘ $remotehost ‘\n ” ;
250 p r i n t ” $remotehost \n ” ;
251 p r i n t ”Remote scan from : ” . $remotehost . ”\n ” ;
252 foreach my $ t a r g e t ( keys %{ $SCANS{$remotehost} {” t a r g e t ”} } ) {
253 p r i n t ” Targeted : ‘” . $ t a r g e t . ” ‘\n ” ;
254 $DstIP = $ t a r g e t ;
255
256 }
257
258 p r i n t ” ” . $SCANS{$remotehost }{” count ”} . ”\n ” ;
259 p r i n t ” ” . $SCANS{$remotehost }{” s t a r t date ”} . ”\n ” ;
260 # my $attempts , $ s t a r t d a t e , $stop date , $scan length ;
261
262 # p r i n t ”Number of attempts : ” . $SCANS{$remotehost} \
263 {” count ”} . ”\n ” ;
264 $attempts = $SCANS{$remotehost }{” count ”} ;
265
266
267 # p r i n t ” S t a r t date : ” . $SCANS{$remotehost }\
268 {” s t a r t date ”} . ”\n ” ;
269 $ s t a r t d a t e = $SCANS{$remotehost }{” s t a r t date ”} ;
270
271 my $ u n i x s t a r t = getUnix ($SCANS{$remotehost} \
272 {” s t a r t date ” } ) ;
273 # p r i n t ” Stop date : ” . $SCANS{$remotehost} \
274 {” stop date ”} . ”\n ” ;
275 $s top date = $SCANS{$remotehost }{” stop date ”} ;
276
277 # p r i n t . $SCANS{$remotehost }{” stop date ”} . ”\n ” ;
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278 my $unixstop = getUnix ($SCANS{$remotehost} \
279 {” stop date ” } ) ;
280 # p r i n t ”Scan length in seconds : ” . \
281 ( $unixstop − $ u n i x s t a r t ) . ”\n ” ;
282 $scan length = ( $unixstop − $ u n i x s t a r t ) ;
283
284 }
285 $ t o t a l a t t e m p t s += $SCANS{$remotehost }{” count ”} ;
286
287 ##########################################################
288
289 p r i n t ” $remotehost \ t $DstIP \ t $attempts \ t \
290 $ s t a r t d a t e \ t $s top date \ t $scan length \ t \
291 $tBTNattempts \n ” ;
292 # p r i n t ” $remotehost \n ” ;
293 }
294 p r i n t ” Tota l number of connect ion attempts : ” . \
295 $ t o t a l a t t e m p t s . ”\n ” ;
296
297 }
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.2 AppendixB
This program prints IP addresses that are found in a give file with their num-
ber of occurrence.
Listing 2: Retrieve IP and number of occurrence of each.
1
2 #!/ usr/bin/p e r l
3 # This program w i l l p r i n t IP addresses t h a t are found in the
4 # given f i l e along s ide the number of occurrence of each IP
5
6 use warnings ;
7 use s t r i c t ;
8
9 # Declar ing v a r i a b l e s and ass ign r e l e v a n t values
10 # the f i r s t v a r i a b l e should be the f i l e path
11 # the second v a r i a b l e holds hash value
12 my $log = ” $fi lename ” ;
13 my %seen = ( ) ;
14
15 # Open the f i l e and read i t l i n e by l i n e
16 # f o r each observed IP address increment number of
17 # observat ion by one
18 open (my $fh , ”<”, $log ) or die ” unable to open $log : $ ! ” ;
19
20 while ( my $ l i n e = <$fh> ) {
21 chomp $ l i n e ;
22
23 i f ( $ l i n e =˜ /(\d{1 , 3}\ .\d{1 , 3}\ .\d{1 , 3}\ .\d{1 ,3} )/ ){
24 $seen{$1 }++;
25 }
26 }
27 c l o s e $fh ;
28
29 # P r i n t r e s u l t s
30 p r i n t ”Remote IP \ t \ t \ t \ t Observed \n ” ;
31 f o r my $key ( keys %seen ) {
32 # p r i n t ”$key \ t \ t $seen{$key}\n ” ;
33 p r i n t ”$key \n ” ;
34
35 }
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.3 AppendixC
This perl script finds the country of origin of IP addresses that are stored in a
file by retrieving information from www.geoiptool.com database.
Listing 3: IP address’s Country Locator
1
2 #!/ usr/bin/p e r l
3 # This p e r l s c r i p t f i n d s the country of o r i g i n of IP addresses
4 # stored in a f i l e by looking information about an IP addresses on
5 # www. geoiptoo l . com .
6 # Run the program : ./ geoIP . pl − i $f i lename
7
8 # Needed packages
9 use Getopt : : Std ; # packages user opt arguments . . .
10 use s t r i c t ” vars ” ; # s t r i c t on v a r i a b l e s
11
12 # Global v a r i a b l e s
13
14 my $VERBOSE = 0 ; # our i s a l s o another option
15 my $DEBUG = 0 ;
16
17 ###############################
18
19 # handle f l a g s and arguments
20 # Example : c == ”−c ” , c : == ”−c argument”
21
22 my $ o p t s t r i n g = ’ hvdi : cCHn ’ ; # h−help , v−verbose , d−debug
23 getopts ( ” $ o p t s t r i n g ” , \my %opt ) or usage ( ) and e x i t 1 ;
24
25 # p r i n t help message i f −h i s invoked
26 i f ( $opt { ’h ’} ) {
27 usage ( ) ;
28 e x i t 0 ;
29 }
30
31
32 my $VERBOSE = 1 i f $opt { ’v ’ } ;
33 my $DEBUG = 1 i f $opt { ’d ’ } ;
34
35
36 # main program content
37
38
39 my $ f i l e = $opt { ’ i ’ } ;
40
41 my @ip ;
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42
43 open ( FILE , ”\ $fi lename ” ) ;
44 while (my $ l i n e=<FILE>){
45 push ( @ip , $ l i n e ) ;
46 }
47 c l o s e ( FILE ) ;
48
49 f o r (my $ i =0; $i<=$# ip ; $ i ++){
50 p r i n t ” $ip [ $ i ]\n ” ;
51 g e t l o c a t i o n ( $ip [ $ i ] ) ;
52 }
53
54
55 #####################################
56 # Helper r o u t i n e s
57
58 sub usage {
59 # p r i n t s the c o r r e c t use of t h i s s c r i p t
60 p r i n t ”Usage : \n ” ;
61 p r i n t ”−h Usage\n ” ;
62 p r i n t ”−v Verbose\n ” ;
63 p r i n t ”−d Debug\n ” ;
64 }
65
66 sub verbose {
67 p r i n t $ [ 0 ] i f ($VERBOSE or $DEBUG ) ;
68 }
69
70 sub debug {
71 p r i n t $ [ 0 ] i f ($DEBUG ) ;
72 }
73
74 sub g e t l o c a t i o n {
75
76 # p r i n t ” IP = $ [ 0 ]\n ” ;
77
78 # Ret r i eve IP information from website database
79 open (GEO, ”wget −q −O − \
80 http ://www. geoiptoo l . com/en/? IP=$ [ 0 ] | ” ) ;
81 while (my $ l i n e = <GEO>){
82
83
84 # Check matching c r i t e r i a and p r i n t s country and c i t y .
85
86 i f ( $ l i n e =˜ /City<\/strong >:\ s ( . * ) < br>. \
87 * Country<\/strong >:\ s ( . * ) < br><s t r / i ){
88 p r i n t ”Country : $2\n ” ;
97
Appendix C. IP address’s Country Locator
89 p r i n t ” City : $1\n ” ;
90
91 }
92 e l s i f ( $ l i n e =˜ /Host\sName:<\/span><\/td>/){
93 $ l i n e = <GEO>;
94 i f ( $ l i n e =˜ /width =”198”.+ c l a s s =” a r i a l b o l d ”>
95 \( .+)<\/ td>/){
96 p r i n t ”Hostname : $1\n ” ;
97
98 l a s t ;
99 }
100 }
101 }
102 c l o s e (GEO) ;
103 }
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.4 AppendixE
This perl script checks if attackers IP address has been reported previously to
Dshield database.
Listing 4: Check Attacker Status against Dshield
1
2 #!/ usr/bin/p e r l
3 # This p e r l s c r i p t r e t r i e v e s IP addresses s t a t u s i f i t has
4 # been previously reported to Dshield as been a malcious IP .
5 # The s c r i p t expects a f i lename with the IP
6 # address to be provided . Look below how to run i t .
7 # Run the program : ./ dshie ld . pl − i $f i lename
8
9 # Needed packages
10 use Getopt : : Std ; # packages user opt arguments . . .
11 use s t r i c t ” vars ” ; # s t r i c t on v a r i a b l e s
12 use HTML: : T a b l e E x t r a c t ;
13
14 # Global v a r i a b l e s
15
16 my $VERBOSE = 0 ; # our i s a l s o another option
17 my $DEBUG = 0 ;
18
19 ###############################
20
21 # handle f l a g s and arguments
22 # Example : c == ”−c ” , c : == ”−c argument”
23
24 my $ o p t s t r i n g = ’ hvdi : cCHn ’ ; # h−help , v−verbose , d−debug
25 getopts ( ” $ o p t s t r i n g ” , \my %opt ) or usage ( ) \
26 and e x i t 1 ; # e x i t 1 i s f o r error ,
27
28 # p r i n t help message i f −h i s invoked
29 i f ( $opt { ’h ’} ) {
30 usage ( ) ;
31 # proper e x i t . e x i t without number takes 0 as a d e f a u l t .
32 e x i t 0 ;
33 }
34
35
36 my $VERBOSE = 1 i f $opt { ’v ’ } ;
37 my $DEBUG = 1 i f $opt { ’d ’ } ;
38
39 # main program content
40
41
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42 my $ f i l e = $opt { ’ i ’ } ;
43
44 my @ip ;
45
46 open ( FILE , ” $ f i l e ” ) ;
47 while (my $ l i n e=<FILE>){
48 push ( @ip , $ l i n e ) ;
49 }
50 c l o s e ( FILE ) ;
51
52 f o r (my $ i =0; $i<=$# ip ; $ i ++){
53
54 g e t l o c a t i o n ( $ip [ $ i ] ) ;
55 }
56
57
58 #####################################
59 # Helper r o u t i n e s
60
61 sub usage {
62 # p r i n t s the c o r r e c t use of t h i s s c r i p t
63 p r i n t ”Usage : \n ” ;
64 p r i n t ”−h Usage\n ” ;
65 p r i n t ”−v Verbose\n ” ;
66 p r i n t ”−d Debug\n ” ;
67 }
68
69 sub verbose {
70 p r i n t $ [ 0 ] i f ($VERBOSE or $DEBUG ) ;
71 }
72
73 sub debug {
74 p r i n t $ [ 0 ] i f ($DEBUG ) ;
75 }
76
77 sub g e t l o c a t i o n {
78 my $te = HTML: : TableExtrac t−>new ( ) ;
79 my ( $ts , $row ) = ’ ’ ;
80 # Ret r i eve IP information from Dshield database
81
82 open (GEO, ”wget −q −O − \
83 http ://www. dshie ld . org/ i p i n f o . html ? ip=$ [ 0 ] | ” ) ;
84 while (my $ l i n e = <GEO>){
85
86 i f ( $ l i n e =˜ /IP Address \ ( c l i c k f o r more d e t a i l \ )\ : / )
87
88 {
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89
90 $ l i n e = ”< tab le >”.” $ l i n e ”.”</ tab le >”;
91
92 # E e x t r a c t the indiv idua l f i e l d s out of the e n t i r e l i n e .
93
94 $te−>parse ( $ l i n e ) ;
95
96 # Examine a l l matching t a b l e s
97 foreach $ t s ( $te−>t a b l e s ) {
98
99 foreach $row ( $ts−>rows ) {
100 my @values = grep {defined } @$row ;
101 my $record = j o i n ( ’ ’ , @values ) ;
102 $record =˜ s /ˆ\ s+//g ;
103 p r i n t ” $record \n ” ;
104 }
105 l a s t ;
106 }
107
108 p r i n t ”\n ” ;
109
110 }
111
112 }
113 c l o s e (GEO) ;
114 }
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.5 AppendixF
This perl script analysed apache log file.
Listing 5: Apache Log Analyser
1
2 #!/ usr/bin/p e r l −w
3 # This p e r l s c r i p t analysed apache
4 # log f i l e . I t p r i n t s the t o t a l number of
5 # attempts f o r each method and as well p r i n t s
6 # the attempt count with type of v u l n e r a b i l i t y
7 # t r i e d
8
9 use s t r i c t ;
10 use warnings ;
11
12 open (LOG, ” $f i lename ” ) ;
13
14 my $options = {} ;
15 my $methods = {} ;
16 my $ u r l s = {} ;
17 my $host ;
18 my $date ;
19 my $url with method ;
20 my $ s t a t u s ;
21 my $ s i z e ;
22 my $ r e f e r r e r ;
23 my $agent ;
24
25 while (my $ l i n e=<LOG>) {
26 ( $host , $date , $url with method , $s ta tus , $s ize , $ r e f e r r e r , $agent ) \
27 = $ l i n e =˜ m/ ˆ (\ S+) − − \ [ (\ S+ [\− |\+]\d{4} )\ ] \
28 ”(\S+ \S+ [ ˆ ” ] + ) ” (\d{3} )
29 (\d+|−) ” ( . * ? ) ” ” ( [ ˆ ” ] + ) ” $ /;
30
31 # Uncommenting next l i n e w i l l make f i l t e r i n g f o r
32 # the s p e c i f i e d month only in the log
33
34 my ( $method , $url , $ht tp ) = s p l i t /\s +/ , $url with method ;
35
36 $ur l =˜ s / \ ? ( . * ) / / ;
37 $ r e f e r r e r =˜ s / \ ? ( . * ) / / ;
38
39 push @{$methods−>{$method}} , $ur l ;
40 $urls−>{$ur l } −> {host } −> { $host } ++;
41 $urls−>{$ur l } −> {count } ++;
42 $urls−>{$ur l } −> { r e f e r r e r } −> { $ r e f e r r e r } ++;
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43 }
44
45
46 # P r i n t s the type of methods with the t o t a l
47 # number f o r each method
48
49 p r i n t ” Connection Methods \ t Number Of Counts \n ” ;
50 foreach my $m ( keys %{$methods } ) {
51 p r i n t ”$m : \ t \ t ” . @{$methods−>{$m}} . ” \n ” ;
52
53 }
54 p r i n t ”Number of Attempts Attempts Mechanism \n ” ;
55 foreach my $ur l ( s o r t { $urls−>{$b}−>{count} <=> $urls−>
56 {$a}−>{count} } keys %{$ u r l s } )
57 {
58 p r i n t f (”%5d %s\n\n” , $ur ls−>{$ur l}−>{count } , $url , ”\n ” ) ;
59
60 my @linesOut ;
61
62 i f ( $options−>{f } ) {
63 my $currentLine =0;
64 foreach my $host ( s o r t { $urls−>{$ur l}−>{host}−>{$b} <=>
65 $urls−>{$ur l}−>{host}−>{$a} } keys %{$urls−> \
66 { $ur l}−>{host }} ) {
67
68 l a s t i f $currentLine > $options−>{t } ;
69 $l inesOut [ $currentLine ] .= s p r i n t f ” %5d %−35.35s ” ,
70 $urls−>{$ur l}−>{host}−>{$host } , $host ;
71 $currentLine ++;
72
73 }
74
75 }
76
77 i f ( $options−>{r } ) {
78 my $currentLine =0;
79 foreach my $ r e f e r r e r ( s o r t { $urls−> \
80 { $ur l}−>{ r e f e r r e r}−>{$b} <=>
81 $urls−>{$ur l}−>{ r e f e r r e r}−>{$a} } \
82 keys %{$urls−>{$ur l}−>{ r e f e r r e r }} ) {
83 l a s t i f $currentLine > $options−>{t } ;
84 $l inesOut [ $currentLine ] .= \
85 s p r i n t f ” %5d %−55.55s ” , $ur ls−>
86 { $ur l}−>{ r e f e r r e r}−>{$ r e f e r r e r } , $ r e f e r r e r ;
87 $currentLine ++;
88 }
89 }
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90
91 }
104
